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Abstract: This paper looks at arrears among US households between 1995 and 2013. It uses household
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) where arrears occur when a household reports it
“sometimes got behind or missed a payment”. The key contribution is that it decomposes the change
in arrears into a behavioural part and a compositional part. Older poorer households increased
arrears between 1995 and 2001 (this reversed in 2004). Younger middle-income households increased
arrears in 2004. Following bankruptcy reform, wealthier households under 50 reduced their arrears
between 2004 and 2007. During the sub-prime recession, everyone except younger low income
households increased their arrears. The decomposition exercise shows that most of the changes
over time are attributed to changes in arrears once the loan is given and not to the change in the
composition of the pool of borrowers.
Keywords: household credit; arrears; bankruptcy; recession
JEL Classification: D12; D14; K42
1. Introduction
This paper investigates the changing pattern of arrears among US households from
1995 to 2013. It will explore who enters arrears and how arrears have changed over time for
different sub-groups of the population. The key contribution of the paper is to decompose
these changes into a contribution from changes in application behaviour, a contribution
from changes in acceptance behaviour by lenders, and a contribution from changes in the
behaviour of borrowers; as well as a contribution from changes in the characteristics of
households. Although a descriptive approach, rather than deriving behaviour from an
underlying theoretical model, this decomposition exercise is fundamental to the policy
debate, but has never been undertaken before this study.
Between 1995 and 2013, the US suffered two recessions. The first lasted from March
to November 2001, and coincided with the dot-com crisis. The second one, lasting from
December 2007 to June 2009 (the official NBER dates), was more serious: precipitated by
the sub-prime crisis, it is often attributed to lax lending standards in the years immediately
before. From the 1990s, there was a sustained increase in the rate of bankruptcy filings
by US households (White (2007), showed it quintupled between 1980 and 2004). This
motivated the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which
made bankruptcy, and by implication default, more onerous. This paper will investigate
how these three events affected household repayment behaviour by using data from the
Survey of Consumer Finances; a survey of US households conducted every three years.
The data show that household arrears increased steadily up until around 2005, fell sharply
following the passing of the Bankruptcy Act in 2005, before increasing again during the
sub-prime crisis (this pattern closely follows the national bankruptcy filing rate). This paper
will document the changes in arrears, investigating which households entered arrears and
how this changed over time. It will also investigate how borrowers and lenders responded
to these events.
There is already a large range of literature, extensively reviewed in Section 2, on
household arrears and default for the period studied in this paper. Much of the literature
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on the behaviour of US households has argued that there was a change in the lending
behaviour, as lending standards became more lax. Other papers have argued that there has
been an increase in the willingness of households, especially lower income households, to
take on more debt. This paper can shed light on these arguments through the following
decomposition exercise. For a household to enter arrears, it must first request a loan; it must
have the credit application accepted; and it must fail to repay when the loan is scheduled
for repayment. Changes in arrears can result from changes in any of these three factors:
an important and unique contribution of this paper is that it provides estimates of the
size of each factor (and of the size of the effect of changing household characteristics on
arrears). Studies which only estimate an overall probability of arrears can provide little
insight into why the arrears (or default) have changed over time. For example, much of
the policy debate following the sub-prime crisis has aimed to address the perceived lax
lending standards of banks prior to the crisis; however, this presumes that the increase in
arrears is caused by previously refused households being given credit, rather than a change
among households already given credit. However, the results will show that most of the
changes in arrears are driven by changes in borrower behaviour, rather than changes in
applications or acceptances. This is rather surprising, and suggests that explanations of the
changes in the level of household default should concentrate on explaining these swings in
borrower behaviour rather than on changes in the composition of the borrower population.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The existing literature on household
default is surveyed in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 describes
the decomposition and the estimation method. The paper will report some preliminary
parametric results in Section 5. However, the preferred results arise from non-parametric
estimates that fully capture the non-linear effect of income and age (and their interaction).
The conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
There are a large number of previous studies which investigate default by households
for part or all of the period between 1995 and 2013. For example, Berkowitz and Hynes (1999);
Domowitz and Sartain (1999); Fay et al. (2002) use survey data to investigate the determi-
nants of bankruptcy filings among US households. Much of the more recent research has
tried to assess the causes of the sub-prime recession. Many studies looked at mortgage
loan data and at county or post-code area: Mian and Sufi (2009) investigate mortgage
defaults using data provided by Equifax at the level of the ZIP code for 1990–2008 and
argued for the importance of “declining underwriting standards as a contributory factor
in the subprime crisis”. Others, such as Dick and Lehnart (2010), have looked at data on
individual loans, and argue that deregulation led to an increase in the supply of credit in
the 1980s and 1990s. Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) and Mayer et al. (2009) use information
contained in lender records from LoanPerformance to show that (after controlling for
observable characteristics) mortgage delinquency increased in the years immediate prior to
the sub-prime crisis, and both argued that deteriorating lending standards or loan quality
appears to be the main culprit in explaining this rise. Foote et al. (2009) use the same data
to show how falls in income drive default. Elul et al. (2010) combine LPS and Equifax data
to explain mortgage arrears during the crisis, again concentrating on the population of
mortgagors. However, looking at actual borrowers ignores the lenders’ decision to give
credit. Dell’Arricia et al. (2012) include rejected loan applicants in their sample, and argue
that there was an increase in credit demand. In contrast, Gerardi et al. (2013) use the PSID,
arguing that unemployment and negative equity are prime explanations for default.
There is also substantial literature on the effect of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act.
The Act attempted to address the dramatic increase in the rate of bankruptcy filings by
households in the years leading up to the reform (see White (2007) for a thorough overview
of the reform). Prior to the reform, households could file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7
(in which all debts are expunged in return for the surrender of all non-exempt assets) or
under Chapter 13 (whereby households proposed a repayment plan but kept their assets).
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Since households could choose under which chapter to file, the Chapter 7 exemptions set
the maximum amount that debtors could be made to pay when filing for bankruptcy, and
these exemptions could be very generous: several states allowed an unlimited homestead
exemption. The 2005 reforms subjected Chapter 7 filings to an income test; reduced the
ability of households to claim the homestead exemption; and raised the cost of filing, partly
by subjecting filers to mandatory counselling and financial management courses.
These reforms changed households incentives to default; they also made it more
difficult for households to default on credit card debt but continue to repay their mortgage
(as had been common under Chapter 7). Livshits et al. (2010) note that prior to the reform,
‘the rise in filings appears mainly to reflect changes in the credit market environment’.
White (2007) argues ‘the increase in credit card debt. . . provides the most convincing [reason
for the] increase in bankruptcy filings’, and the reforms encouraged the expansion of credit
card debt by lenders, as it became easier to recover these debts. Using state level data,
Morgan, Inverson and Botsch Morgan et al. (2012) argue that after 2005, there was an
increase in mortgage foreclosure and a reduction in delinquency on personal loans in high
exemption states. Li et al. (2011) use data on individual mortgages to argue that default
rates increased, particularly among those affected by the means test introduced by the
reforms. In a calibration exercise, Athreya et al. (2015) simulate the US economy in which
heterogeneous agents face labour market and unemployment risks to investigate the role
of the 2005 bankruptcy reform on delinquency and bankruptcy filings. They argue that
reform reduces the demand for credit but increases the supply and that the reform would
have reduced delinquency but for the sub-prime recession.
Much of the literature above on the sub-prime recession has looked a mortgage debt;
in contrast this paper will concentrate on all debts. While mortgage debts are typically
larger, most default is associated with concurrent delinquency on non-housing debt. For
example, Elul et al. (2010) argue that mortgage defaults are associated with high credit card
utilization rates and negative equity, with especially serious default rates when these factors
both occur at the same time. Gerardi et al. (2013), using the PSID, note that households in
serious arrears invariably have large levels of outstanding unsecured debt.
Changes in arrears can be attributed to changes in the incidence of households ap-
plying for loans; changes in the rate at which loans are accepted; or changes in the rate at
which borrowers repay their loans. In the review of the literature above, several papers
noted an increase in the supply of credit while Athreya et al. (2015) argues for a reduction in
credit applications. Keyes et al. (2010) argue that securitization has had a negative effect on
the screening incentives of sub-prime lenders, suggesting an increase acceptance rate. An
alternative view, expressed in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales Guiso et al. (2013), is that there
was an increase in households’ willingness to default, given their circumstances, during
the recession. This paper will discuss the relative importance of changes in applications,
acceptances, and arrears among borrowers in the changing arrears behaviour of American
households.
3. Data
This paper uses data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). This survey,
conducted by the US Federal Reserve Board normally every three years, is designed to give
detailed information on the income and assets of US households, as well as information on
the demographic characteristics of each household in the survey. More complete details on
the survey design are contained in Kennickell (2012) and Bricker et al. (2014). As well as
income and assets, the SCF also records information on households’ borrowing behaviour:
in particular, households report whether they have applied for credit (and whether their
application was accepted); whether they currently have a loan, and whether they have
made each scheduled repayment on time. However, the survey does not report details of
the lender, and hence cannot offer much insight into the behaviour of banks. Nevertheless,
the paper will exploit this information about US households to understand the evolution
of repayment behaviour over the last 20 years. (One problem is that information on
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applications, including refusals, relates to the last five years, but information on loans and
their repayment pertain to the last year only).
This paper concentrates on households aged between 25 and 65 (older and younger
households are excluded). Since the primary focus of the analysis is households who use
borrowing to smooth consumption, we exclude farming and self-employed households
from the analysis (as well as households who seem to have no source of income). After this
selection, there are around 3500 households in each wave. Income is measured in 2004 real
dollars using the all urban consumers CPI index. Since the aim of this paper is to examine
what has happened to the repayment behaviour of US households over the last 20 years, it
will use questions on loan and repayment behaviour of every wave of the SCF from 1995
to 2013 (the last year for which the survey is available).
Table 1 reports summary statistics (the mean and the standard deviation) for the vari-
ables used in the regression analysis, with separate statistics for all households (including
non-borrowers), for those who repay their debts on schedule, and those who report arrears.
The table shows that nearly two-thirds of households are couples, that over one-third have
a university degree, and that over 70 percent of households are white. The table also shows
that those households who repay their debts on schedule have slightly higher income than
the general population, are more likely to be in a couple, and are more likely to be white.
In contrast, those households that report arrears have lower income, are less likely to be in
a couple, to have been to university, or to be white.
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
All Repay Arrears
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
ln-income 4.09 1.46 4.26 1.37 3.32 0.84
age 45.3 11.1 45.3 10.9 41.7 10.2
couple 0.63 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.53 0.50
university 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.17 0.37
white 0.72 0.44 0.76 0.43 0.61 0.48
Author’s own calculations using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1995–2013. Income is annual
income measured in log-2004 dollars (1000 s). Couple, university, white and friends give the proportion of
households who are in a couple, where the head went to university, and where the head is white. The table
reports summary statistics for all households, for those who report they repay their loan, and for those who report
they are in arrears.
Of particular interest in this paper is the repayment behaviour of US households.
We will therefore look at whether the household responds that they have failed to repay
a loan on schedule. Since the survey combines mortgage or other housing loans and
non-housing debt when asking households to respond to this question, this paper will
too.1 A household is defined as being in arrears if it responds that it “sometimes got
behind or missed payments” when asked about the household’s loans. Note that this
encompasses widely differing behaviour: it could mean that a household has failed to
make a number of payments and has filed for bankruptcy; or it could mean that the
household has made a single late payment that they have quickly rectified when they
have an otherwise exemplary record. Figure 1 reports the rate of arrears for each year in
the sample constructed from the SCF. It also reports the bankruptcy rate for non-business
filings in the US.2 Comparing the two series shows that reported arrears in the SCF follows
the same pattern as non-business bankruptcy filings, although many more households are
in arrears than are filing for bankruptcy. Both series show that arrears and bankruptcy
increased steadily in the 1990s, with the recession of 2001 (March–November), associated
1 Andersson et al. (2013) discuss how the decision to default on different assets has been changing over time. Their paper, however, uses lender data
and only includes households who default on at least one loan, meaning that their sample is highly selected.
2 This number is constructed by dividing the level of non-business filings reported by the American Bankruptcy Institute by the number of households
in the US which is obtained from the US Census Office.
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with the dot-com bubble, having almost no noticeable effect on this trend. Bankruptcy
and arrears have fallen sharply after the enactment of the 2005 bankruptcy reforms made
bankruptcy more onerous. However, both arrears and bankruptcy have returned nearly to
previous levels during the sub-prime crisis, and has only slowly fallen since 2009. The fact
that both series show a similar pattern means we can place some confidence in the figures
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Figure 1. Comparing SCF Arrears to Bankruptcy Filings. Note: US Bankruptcy Filing Rate drawn
with dashes (right-axis) and Arrears reported in the SCF drawn with solid line (left-axis). Authors own
calculations using the SCF and using the non-business bankruptcy filings reported by the American
Bankruptcy Institute divided by the number of US households reported by the US Census office.
Table 2 reports some further details about borrowing behaviour. The first column
looks at the level of default in the sub-population of the SCF included in the analysis (and
plotted in Figure 1). It again highlights the steady increase in the rate of arrears in the early
part of the sample, the sharp reduction in arrears in the 2007 wave, and the return to high
rates of arrears in 2010 and 2013. The second column restricts attention to those actually
borrowing; showing a very similar pattern to the first column. Column 3 of Table 2 shows
that the proportion of households with a loan steadily increased from 1995 to 2007, before
falling back in the last two waves. This immediately highlights that in 2007, there was
both an increase in the number of households borrowing and a reduction in the number of
households in arrears. Both 2010 and 2013 saw a reduction in the number of households
borrowing to levels lower than in 1998, while arrears have risen above the figure in 2007.
The table also shows that there was an increase in the rate at which households failed
to get the credit they wanted, and a decline in the rate at which households wanted
credit. The next section will run regressions to explore the differing behaviour of different
household types.
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Table 2. Comparing Borrowing and Arrears Across Years.
Arrears Arrears Loan Refused Apply(All) (Borrow) Credit Credit
1995 5.80 6.94 73.83 16.37 90.20
1998 6.51 7.52 81.34 13.47 94.81
2001 6.39 7.36 81.09 13.21 94.30
2004 7.44 8.54 80.55 12.94 93.49
2007 5.02 5.77 82.58 12.94 95.52
2010 8.34 9.94 77.74 16.10 93.83
2013 7.21 8.56 78.21 15.77 93.99
Author’s own calculations using the SCF from 1995–2013. The first column reports the proportion of all households
who report arrears. The second column reports arrears among actual borrowers. The third column reports the
proportion of household who have a loan. The fourth column reports the proportions of households either refused
a loan or discouraged from applying because they believed they would be refused. The last column reports the
proportion who applied or otherwise wanted a loan.
4. Methodology
The raw data suggest that arrears increased among older households in the 2001 and
2010 recessions, but that younger households increased their level of arrears in 2004 and
after the crisis in 2008. However, we would like to say something about the underlying
causes of the observed changes in arrears behaviour. Suppose we denote
D = 1l{The loan is in arrears}
C = 1l{The loan application is accepted}
A = 1l{The loan is applied for}
This paper will investigate the incidence of households being in arrears (e.g., whether
a household is actually in arrears, rather than the propensity of the household to default
on a loan).3 For a household to be observed in arrears, it needs to have applied for credit,
to have received the credit it asked for, and then to have failed to repay this credit when
it is due. That is, for a household with characteristics X = x in wave t, the probability of
observing a household in arrears is
Prt(D = 1, C = 1, A = 1|X = x) =Prt(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x) ·
Prt(C = 1|A = 1, X = x) · Prt(A = 1|X = x)
(1)
Hence, a change in the observed arrears behaviour of a household with characteristics
X = x could be because of a change in the arrears behaviour of the household if it is given
a loan Prt(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x); a change in the behaviour of lenders when they
receive a credit application Prt(C = 1|A = 1, X = x); or a change in application behaviour
Prt(A = 1|X = x). We can understand the effect of a change in applications between
waves t and s by noting
Prt(D = 1, C = 1, A = 1|X = x)− Prs(D = 1, C = 1, A = 1|X = x)
= Prt(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x) · Prt(C = 1|A = 1, X = x) · Prt(A = 1|X = x)
− Prs(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x) · Prs(C = 1|A = 1, X = x) · Prs(A = 1|X = x)
(2)
3 Grant and Padula (2018) have an extensive discussion of the difference between the propensity to default and observed default, and how to estimate
each. They explain the later is a lower bound for the former.
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The change in arrears between waves t and s can be broken down into a part due to a
change in applications, a part due to a change in acceptances by the lender, and a part due
to changes in arrears among borrowers. Writing
Prt(D = 1, C = 1, A = 1|X = x)− Prs(D = 1, C = 1, A = 1|X = x)
=
[
Prt(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x) · Prt(C = 1|A = 1, X = x) · Prt(A = 1|X = x)




Prs(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x) · Prt(C = 1|A = 1, X = x) · Prt(A = 1|X = x)




Prs(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x) · Prs(C = 1|A = 1, X = x) · Prt(A = 1|X = x)
− Prs(D = 1|C = 1, A = 1, X = x) · Prs(C = 1|A = 1, X = x) · Prs(A = 1|X = x)]
(3)
shows how this simple decomposition can be constructed. The last part of the right-
hand side of the equation has kept the estimates of acceptances among applications and
arrears amongst borrowers from time s, but has used the estimate of application behaviour
from time t. Hence, this part of the equation captures the effect on arrears of a change
in application behaviour. The second part of the equation shows the effect of changing
acceptance behaviour on arrears; and the first part of the equation shows the effect of
changing the repayment behaviour of borrowers.
Estimation
The estimation strategy entails estimates estimating the probability of a household,
with a given set a characteristics, applying for a loan; having the loan application accepted;
and repaying the loan when required to do so. These estimates could be constructed as
simple Probit regressions, and the analysis will begin by reporting some results that arise
from using Probit estimates. However, some more detailed results will be reported using
non-parametric estimates.
In the non-parametric estimates, rather than use a fully parametric estimator to
describe the effect of a set of household characteristics Xi for household i on arrears
Di (or applications Ai or acceptances Ci), the relationship is estimated using a Kernel
estimator which avoids making the strong assumptions that would be necessary if a Probit
or Logit estimator is used (see Blundell et al. (2007) for an example of this approach).
A clear advantage of using a non-parametric estimator is that it will allow the age-effect,
for instance, to differ at different points in the income distribution. It will also allow
estimation of highly non-linear (and non-monotonic) effects of the other variables. The
kernel estimates of the effect of the household characteristics on arrears E(Di|Xi) (similarly
applications and acceptances) are constructed using the Nadarya–Watson kernel estimator
(see Härdle et al. (1988)). The variances of the kernel estimators are constructed using
Bowman and Azzalini (1997) (see also Pagan and Ullah (1999)). There will be separate
regressions for each wave of the data.
5. Results
Some simple parametric regression results are discussed before the non-parametric
results are reported. As we will see, the non-parametric results provide more nuanced
details on the results reported in the paper, but are not substantively different from the
results arising from the probit regressions. In both cases, the decomposition exercise will
find that most of the changes in arrears over time can be attributed to changes in the
repayment behaviour of borrowers, rather than changes in either loan applications or loan
acceptances.
5.1. Parametric Results
The results from a Probit regression of the effect of a set of household characteristics
Xi for household i on arrears Di are reported for each wave in Table 3, with similar results
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across waves. Younger households are more likely to be in arrears than older households
(the differences between age-groups is significant in all waves except 2007). Except in the
first wave, lower income households are significantly more likely to be in arrears than
higher income households. There are also differences in the effect of the other household
variables on arrears, but couple, gender, and college education are only significant in one
of the waves, and being white is never significant in these regressions.
Table 3. Probability of Non-Default Among All Households.
1995 2001 2004 2007 2010
Age 25–34 −0.516 ** −1.344 ** −0.691 ** −0.334 −0.423 **
(0.193) (0.360) (0.179) (0.185) (0.131)
Age 35–44 −0.456 * −1.111 ** −0.709 ** −0.413* −0.719 **
(0.195) (0.362) (0.176) (0.179) (0.125)
Age 45–54 −0.368 −1.226 ** −0.420 * −0.426 * −0.628 **
(0.199) (0.361) (0.181) (0.177) (0.122)
Age 55–64 −0.076 −1.209 ** −0.117 −0.222 −0.345 **
(0.232) (0.365) (0.198) (0.186) (0.127)
Income Decile 1–2 −0.582 −1.250 ** −1.300 ** −1.690 ** −0.970 **
(0.298) (0.358) (0.334) (0.334) (0.151)
Income Decile 3–4 −0.682 * −1.355 ** −1.320 ** −1.690 ** −0.887 **
(0.287) (0.349) (0.328) (0.326) (0.145)
Income Decile 5–6 −0.632 * −1.155 ** −1.359 ** −1.417 ** −0.715 **
(0.279) (0.345) (0.321) (0.323) (0.142)
Income Decile 7–8 −0.328 −0.722 * −0.950 ** −1.080 ** −0.543 **
(0.286) (0.348) (0.325) (0.322) (0.141)
couple 0.061 −0.214 0.046 0.315 * −0.087
(0.159) (0.150) (0.126) (0.135) (0.095)
gender −0.081 −0.051 −0.167 0.276 * −0.169
(0.150) (0.143) (0.116) (0.129) (0.088)
college 0.212 0.159 0.088 0.105 0.238 **
(0.124) (0.121) (0.102) (0.112) (0.074)
white 0.103 0.137 −0.035 −0.132 0.023
(0.103) (0.097) (0.086) (0.098) (0.061)
household size −0.097 * −0.053 −0.057 −0.105 ** −0.041
(0.038) (0.037) (0.032) (0.036) (0.024)
homeowner 0.271 ** 0.288 ** 0.318 ** 0.054 −0.013
(0.103) (0.101) (0.089) (0.100) (0.067)
Constant 2.601 ** 3.886 ** 3.313 ** 3.144 ** 2.956 **
(0.427) (0.567) (0.433) (0.435) (0.246)
N 2442 2619 2925 3140 4768
test: Age 10.56 16.28 31.72 7.28 46.05
(prob) 0.032 0.003 0.000 0.122 0.000
test: Income 9.42 27.04 24.65 38.52 46.67
(prob) 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Results for a Probit regression on whether the household has failed to repay a loan, including households who have not had a loan
(standard errors in parenthesis). The coefficients are marked * if significant at 5 percent ** if significant at 1 percent.
The supplementary material in the Appendix A reports the results of a Probit regres-
sion for wave of the data for the the effect of household characteristics on application
behaviour A, acceptance behaviour C and repayment among borrowers R. In each case,
the results are broadly in line with expectations. Younger households, and higher in-
come households, are more likely to apply for credit, and more likely to receive credit.
Lower income households are less likely to repay should they receive a loan. Most of the
other household characteristics do not have a consistent and clear affect on applications,
acceptances, or repayment among borrowers.
The results of these individual regressions, in themselves, are of only minor interest.
More interesting is to understand how these regression results are changing over time, and
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how this affects the pattern of arrears in the population over time: understanding this issue
is a key aim of this paper. Table 4 reports how overall arrears are changing over time, and
the decomposition exercise based on Equation (3) above. The top row of Table 4 reports the
predicted level of arrears that arise from the regression results (the weighted average of
each households probability of non-payment D for each of the waves). It shows that the
regression analysis predicts that 6.6 percent of households are in arrears in 1995; this falls
to 6 percent in 2001; rises to 8.2 percent in 2004; falls in 2007 (the eve of the financial crisis);
and rises again to a peak in 2010. Unsurprisingly, this pattern mirrors the actual arrears in
the population reported earlier.
Table 4. Decomposing the Change in Arrears: Parametric Results.
1995 2001 2004 2007 2010
Prt(D|Xt) 6.59 6.04 8.22 6.17 8.85
Prt(D|Xt+1) 6.27 6.08 7.94 6.46 .
. . . Prt+1(A|Xt) 7.00 6.15 8.26 6.08
. . . Prt+1(C|Xt) 7.74 6.04 8.51 5.98
. . . Prt+1(R|Xt) 6.41 8.44 6.21 8.64
The table reports the predicted level of arrears in each year in row one. In the second row, the predicted level of
arrears used the following period’s household characteristics. Rows three to five, the predicted level of arrears
uses the next period’s estimated equation for applications (A); additionally, the next period’s estimated credit
acceptances among applicants (C); and additionally next period’s estimated Repayment among borrowers (R).
The second column constructs an estimate of the predicted level of arrears in the
population using the probit regression coefficients of the current wave Prt, but the char-
acteristics of the households in the next wave Xt+1.4 Using the 1995 Probit estimates, but
the 2001 household characteristics, the predicted level of arrears is 6.27 percent. The 1995
characteristics (the cell above), had predicted a level of arrears of 6.59 percent. This suggests
that slightly over half of the difference between predicted arrears in 1995 and predicted
arrears in 2001 can be explained by changes in the characteristics of the households between
these two waves of the data. What happens when we repeat this analysis for the change
in predicted arrears between 2001 and 2004. The table shows that predicted arrears rose
6.04 to 8.22 percent. However, replacing the 2001 household characteristics with the 2004
characteristics only increased arrears to 6.08, a negligible increase. Predicted arrears fall to
6.17 percent in 2007, but the change in characteristics only reduce it to 7.94; again, a very
small effect. In the last wave, the regression model predicts arrears at 8.85 percent, but the
change in characteristics between 2007 and 2010 only increases arrears to 6.46 percent. The
overall story seems to be that changes in household characteristics are only a small part
of the explanation of the change in the level of arrears between the different waves of the
data.
The bottom three rows of Table 4 show the effect on arrears of first changing the
application behaviour of households A, then changing the acceptance of lenders C and
finally changing the repayment behaviour of borrowers R. The first column and row three
construct the predicted level of arrears using the 1995 household characteristics, the 2001
regression for applications A, and the 1995 regression for acceptance C and repayment R.
This means, compared to the top column, the only change is that we are using the estimated
application behaviour from 2001 in place of the 1995 application behaviour. This change in
application behaviour means that predicted arrears rise from 6.59 percent to 7.00 percent.
Arrears fell between these two waves, but the change in application behaviour, by itself,
increased arrears. The fourth row shows the effect of using the 2001 regression equation
for applications A and acceptances C, which increases arrears to 7.74 percent (again the
effect is in the opposite direction to the overall fall in arrears between 1995 and 2001).
The last row shows the effect of using the 2001 model for arrears A, acceptances C and
4 Note that since there is no estimate for period t + 1 in the last column, the row is empty.
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repayment among borrowers R, but using the 1995 household characteristics. Predicted
arrears fall to 6.41 percent, suggesting a substantial proportion of the change in the overall
arrears between 1995 and 2001 can be explained by the change in repayment behaviour of
borrowers. The change in arrears between the bottom row of column 1 and the top row
of column 2 shows the effect of changing characteristics: arrears fall to 6.04 percent. This
suggests there is an important effect from changing characteristics, but this effect is smaller
than the change in repayment behaviour.
This type of analysis can be repeated for the changes between the other waves included
in the analysis. Between 2001 and 2004, the change in applications slightly increased arrears,
and the change in acceptances slightly reduced arrears. However, these effects are small:
the largest effect is from the change in repayment behaviour which increases arrears from
6.04 percent to 8.44 percent. Between 2004 and 2007, applications and arrears very slightly
increase arrears; but the change in repayment behaviour among borrowers dramatically
reduces arrears from 8.51 percent to 6.21 percent. Finally, between 2007 and 2010, the
change in application behaviour and acceptance behaviour slightly reduced arrears, from
6.17 percent to 5.98 percent. The change in acceptance behaviour between these two waves
then raises arrears to 8.64 percent.
The overall story that clearly arises from the decomposition exercise reported in
Table 4 is that the change in default between different waves of the data is that application
and acceptance behaviour seem to play little role in explaining the change in arrears (and
the sign of their effect on arrears is of the ‘wrong’ sign). There is a moderate effect from
changes in characteristics between 1995 and 2001, and again between 2007 and 2010, but
the effect is rather small, and cannot explain much of the change in default behaviour.
Overwhelmingly, the change in arrears between waves is the result of the substantial
swings in the default behaviour of borrowing households.
The change in arrears can differ substantially with household characteristics, and
this is investigated in Table 5, although the effect of only some household characteristics
are reported.5 It shows that between 1995 and 2001, the oldest age group included in
the table had a significant increase in their level of arrears (the changes reported in the
table are starred when they are significant at the 5 percent level). However, the other
changes between 1995 and 2001 are never statistically significant. Between 2001 and 2004,
households between 35 and 44 increase their level of arrears by over 5 percent, and there is
a significant increase in arrears for couples and for poorly educated households. Arrears
fell between 2004 and 2007 for younger households, and for poorly educated households.
The increase in arrears between 2007 and 2010 was significant for middle-aged households
and for almost all income groups (although the increase was larger for lower income
households). A more thorough investigation of the differences between demographic
groups will be undertaken, with some fully non-parametric regressions.
5.2. Non-Parametric Estimates of Arrears
The non-parametric regression results for each of the individual waves are reported
in detail in the supporting material in Appendix B, and are only summarised here since
the main focus of the paper is the decomposition exercise. Each regression includes age
and income, and some households characteristics as explanatory variables, with separate
regressions estimated for each wave of the SCF. The main section of the paper will plot
the results using figures; they are discussed further in the appendix. The figures do not
plot confidence intervals, since it would make the figures too cluttered to be easily read.
The analysis here will also concentrate on the age and income variables although other
household characteristics are included in the kernel regressions. The non-parametric results
will confirm that most of the changes in arrears over time can be attributed to changes in
the repayment behaviour of borrowers rather than changes in either loan applications or
loan acceptances.
5 The changes are calculated using delta methods, implemented as a routine in stata, holding the other variables at their median.
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Table 5. The Change in Arrears for different groups: Parametric Results.
1995–2001 2001–2004 2004–2007 2007–2010
∆D ∆D ∆D ∆D
Age groups
25–34 2.12 2.03 −4.98 * 2.29
35–44 −0.02 5.10 * −4.49 * 6.29 *
45–54 2.01 −0.25 −0.22 4.47 *
55–64 3.73 * −2.76 0.57 2.29
Couple
0 −0.09 3.63 * −2.94 * 2.43 *
1 0.65 −0.11 −1.52 * 3.23 *
University
0 0.90 1.90 * −2.50 * 3.58 *
1 −0.28 0.95 −1.34 1.71 *
Income groups
1 3.62 −2.11 4.15 5.95 *
2 4.32 −3.43 3.94 4.08
3 2.01 −0.25 −0.22 4.47 *
4 0.36 0.01 0.29 4.62 *
5 −0.50 −0.16 −0.03 2.14 *
Results are for parametric regressions (where group 1 is the lowest income group and group 5 the highest
income group). In bold is the change in arrears among all households (∆D) between the two years (starred when
statistically significant at the 5 percent level).
Figure 2 plots the regression results for the level of arrears among all households for
each wave of the data from 1995 to 2013 (Appendix B contains more details). The top panel
shows how the age profile of arrears has changed for each wave of the survey (holding the
other variables at their median value). Arrears are two-to-three times higher at younger
ages than at older ages; and the difference between age groups is statistically significant in
every wave. Middle-aged households have intermediate rates of arrears.
More interestingly for this paper, arrears for each age-group change from year to
year. By 2001 (the year of the dot-com crisis), the arrears rate is significantly higher than
in 1995 for households aged 53 and above: at age 65, the rate of arrears increased from
2.72% of households to 6.52% of households. In 2004, the youngest households under 45
are significantly more likely to report arrears compared to 1998 or 1995. However, older
households are not now more likely to enter arrears than in these earlier years (repayment
rates are significantly higher among households age 57 and over in 2004 than in 2001).6
Recall that households were surveyed in 2007 before the sub-prime crisis had started, but
after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 had tried to make bankruptcy more difficult for
those with above median levels of income.7 The rates of arrears among younger households
recovered in 2007 (their arrears was significantly lower than in 2004), but arrears for older
households are not significantly different to earlier years. The contrast between the 2010
and 2007 wave reflects the effect of the subprime crisis. The figure shows arrears increased
significantly at all age-groups over the age of 35, and these rates of arrears remained high
in 2013. The preliminary conclusion from this analysis is that arrears increased among
middle-aged and older households both in the dot-com recession and in the subprime
crisis, and that arrears among younger households had been especially high just prior to
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005.
6 This kind of nuance would not be easy to see without using anon-parametric regression, which places no functional form assumptions on the effect
of age and year on rates of arrears.
7 The Act required the median to be calculated within the state rather than nationally, as done here. The Act also made it slightly more difficult to
claim the homestead exemption in those states where it is large.
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Figure 2. The Effect of Age and Income on Repayment Among All Households.Note: These are kernel estimates of the
percentage of households who are in arrears (where non-borrowing households are not in arrears) as age/income changes,
holding the other variables fixed at their median value. The estimates of income are at every 10th centile of the income
distribution (and additionally the 5th and 95th centile).
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The effect of income on arrears at age 45 is reported in the bottom panel of Figure 2.
The figure plots arrears for each decile of the income distribution (and at the 5th and 95th
centile). In 1995, over 10% of households at the 5th centile of income (the bottom of the
income range) are in arrears, but only 3% of households at the 95th centile are in arrears.
The results in 1998 and 2001 show similar differences by income (these differences are
statistically significant). In 2004, there has been a sharp, statistically significant increase
in arrears, especially among middle-income and higher income households. The fact
that the increase in arrears was among these income groups explains the focus that the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 placed on making it more difficult for richer households
to escape their debts. Indeed, in 2007, there was a statistically significant fall in rates of
arrears among middle and higher income households: rates of arrears had returned to
those observed in earlier years, suggesting that the Act had succeeded in its objectives.
Arrears increased following the onset of the subprime crisis in 2010: low, middle, and high
income households all increased arrears by around 6%. In 2013, there was a small but
statistically insignificant recovery in rates of arrears at all income groups.
A key advantage of using a non-parametric estimator is that the estimation can
allow for the effect of income to be different for younger households compared to older
households. These results are discussed in more detail in the supporting evidence. For
households at age 30, over 13% of households at the 10th centile of income are in arrears in
1995, while only around 4.4% of households in the 90th centile are in arrears. In contrast,
for 60-year-old households, 5.2% households at the 10th centile of income are in arrears,
while being only 1.6% of the 90th centile rate of arrears. These differences are statistically
significant. These arrears changed over time. By 2001, there was a sharp deterioration in
repayment rates for lower income households, with poor older households more likely
to be in arrears than poor younger households: at the 10th income decile, the rate of
arrears is around 15.1% for 60-year-olds, but only 11.9% at age 30. In 2004, with the
recovery of the economy after the dot-com recession, the rate of arrears of low-income
older households recovered to pre-recession levels, and, surprisingly, differences across
income levels for these older households are no longer statistically significant. In contrast,
younger household arrears increased at all income levels (these differences are statistically
significant for middle-income households). Rates of arrears for the youngest households
fell in 2007: from 14.7% to 10.4% for households at the 10th income centile; from 15.7%
to 9.6% for middle-income households; and from 9.6% to 5.2% at the 90th centile. Older
households, however, have not significantly changed their level of arrears. Overall, young
and middle-aged households of middling income increased their rate of arrears in 2004, and
that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 was successful in reversing this increase in arrears
in 2007. Following the sub-prime crisis, for younger households, arrears increased for all
income groups: low-income households increased arrears from 10.3% to 15.2% (although
this is not statistically significant); while high income household arrears increased from
5.2% to 9.8%. Arrears also increased for older households: lower income households
increased arrears from 5.6% to 11.9%, while higher income households increased arrears
from 2.3% to 5.1%. These results are similar to what we found for middle-aged households.
5.3. Application and Acceptance Behaviour
A key aim of the paper is to understand the extent to which the changing pattern of
arrears can be attributed to either changes in the application behaviour of households or
the lending behaviour of banks. Section 5.4 below will describe this decomposition, but
before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly describe some estimates of the probability of
a household applying for a loan and the probability of an applicant household receiving
a loan (these results are described in more detail in the additional supporting material in
Appendix C at the end of the paper).
Figure 3 shows how application behaviour has been changing between waves: the
top panel shows application behaviour at different ages, while the bottom panel shows
different income groups in each wave; in each case, all other variables are held at their
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2021, 14, 43 14 of 40
median. The top panel shows that, while in each year, the difference across age groups is
not large, nevertheless, credit applications have been changing over time. Significantly
more households desired credit in 1998 than in 1995 at all age levels (there was a 3 percent
increase at younger ages, and a 4 percent increase at older ages). Similarly, in 2007, the
demand for credit was significantly higher than in 2004. The demand for credit then fell
significantly in 2010 for the oldest households, and had fallen back to 2004 levels for all
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Note: These are kernel estimates of the percentage of households who are in arrears (where non-borrowing households
are not in arrears) as age/income changes, holding the other variables fixed at their median value. The estimates of
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Figure 3. The Effect of Age and Income on Applications for Credit Among Households. Note: These are kernel estimates
of the percentage of households that wish to have credit as age/income changes holding the ther variables fixed at their
median value. The estimates of income are at every 10th centile of the income distribution (and additionally the 5th and
95th centile).
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The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that in each year, low income households are
significantly less likely to apply for credit than high income households. Moreover, the
proportion of households wanting credit in each income group has been changing over
time. More households wanted credit in 1998 and 2001 compared to 1995, and this increase
was larger for lower income households. There was a small, but statistically insignificant
decline in the desire for credit in 2004, before the desire for credit recovered in 2007: this
increase was concentrated in lower income households. Finally, there has been a decline in
households reporting that they would like a loan between 2007 and 2013.
Figure 4 describes the rate at which credit applications are accepted by the lender and
given the loan. The top panel of the figure shows that in the early years of the sample; younger
households are significantly more likely to get the credit they want than older households.
Although credit acceptance increased for all households in 1998 and 2001, this increase was
larger for these older households. In 2004, credit to older households continued to increase,
while there was a sharp decline in credit to the youngest households. This decline reversed in
2007. In 2010 and 2013, households of all ages saw a decline in credit acceptance, but the falls
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Figure 4. The Effect of Age and Income on Credit Acceptance Among Applicant Households. Note:
These are kernel estimates of the percentage of households that wish to have credit actually receive
credit as age/income changes holding the other variables fixed at their median value. The estimates of
income are at every 10th centile of the income distribution (and additionally the 5th and 95th centile).
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The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows that, in all years, low income households are
significantly less likely to get credit they want than high-income households. At the top of
the income distribution, there is no statistical difference in credit acceptance over the years,
as changes in credit acceptance over time are concentrated in middle- and low-income
households. For example, middle-income households are 2.8 percent more likely to get
credit in 2001 than in 1995, while households at the 10th income centile are 5.4 percent
more likely to get credit in 2001 (although the higher variance of the low-income estimates
mean this difference in not statistically significant). Credit acceptance declined in 2004 for
all households below the 50th centile, with the declines much larger for the lowest income
households, and failed to much recover in 2007. The results in 2010 and 2013 are similar to
those in 2004.
5.4. Decomposing the Arrears Behaviour
The raw data suggest that arrears increased among older households in the 2001 and
2010 recessions, but that younger households increased their level of arrears in 2004 and
after the crisis in 2008. However, we would like to say something more about the the
observed changes in arrears behaviour. Table 6 shows the results of the decomposition ex-
ercise described by Equation (3) in Section 4. It reports the change in default for 1995–2001,
2001–2004, 2004–2007 and 2007–2010 in bold, with the results starred when the regression
results reported earlier had shown the changes to be statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level. For age and income, these results correspond to those reported in Figure 2.
Looking at the table, the first result in bold at the top of the left-hand column shows that
for 25-year-old households, arrears increased by 2.63 percent; but this is not statistically
significant (it is not starred). The next three columns denote how much of the change
in default can be attributed to changes in applications (A), to credit acceptance among
applicants (C), and to repayment among borrowers (R) using Equation (1) above. The effect
of changes in application behaviour (holding acceptances and arrears among borrowers
fixed at their 1995 level) is to increase arrears by 0.26 percent; the effect of credit-acceptance
increases arrears by 0.40 percent and repayment among borrowers increases arrears by
1.98 percent between 1995 and 2001. Overall, putting all these effects together results in a
increase in arrears behaviour, which, however, is not statistically significant. We can repeat
this process for each group and each pair of years in the table to review the cause of the
observed changes in arrears behaviour, in order to better understand what has happened
during the period of study.
Between 1995 and 2001, the change in arrears was found to be significant for house-
holds whose head is age 53 and over (the change in arrears, shown in the bolded ∆D
column, is marked with an asterisk). At 53, the arrears increased by 2.71 percent. The de-
composition exercise shows that the change in application behaviour (shown in column A),
increased arrears by 0.17 percent; the change in acceptance behaviour (column C) increased
arrears by 0.18 percent; and the change in the repayment behaviour of borrowers (column
R) increased arrears by 2.35 percent. This result suggests that over 85 percent of the change
in arrears among 53-year-old households is driven by changes in borrower behaviour
rather than changes in the composition of the borrower population. A similar conclusion
arises for households aged 57, where changes in repayment among borrowers account for
3.45 percent of the 3.75 percent change in arrears; and the results are also similar among
61-year-old households and 65-year-old households where most of the change in arrears
again seems to be the consequence of a change in the repayment behaviour of borrowers.
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Table 6. Decomposing the Change in Arrears 1995–2013: Non-Parametric Results.
1995–2001 2001–2004 2004–2007 2007–2010
∆D A C R ∆D A C R ∆D A C R ∆D A C R
Age
25 2.63 0.26 0.40 1.98 3.58 −0.15 −0.92 4.64 −4.88 * 0.50 1.09 −6.47 0.41 −0.18 −0.88 1.47
29 2.44 0.24 0.32 1.89 3.76 * −0.12 −0.77 4.66 −5.52 * 0.42 0.80 −6.74 1.90 −0.11 −0.70 2.71
33 1.94 0.24 0.25 1.44 3.99 * −0.09 −0.61 4.69 −5.65 * 0.34 0.51 −6.51 3.34 * −0.06 −0.53 3.93
37 1.28 0.27 0.22 0.79 4.03 * −0.06 −0.46 4.56 −5.16 * 0.28 0.25 −5.68 4.53 * −0.03 −0.36 4.93
41 0.77 0.28 0.20 0.29 3.65 * −0.03 −0.33 4.01 −4.09 * 0.24 0.05 −4.38 5.29 * −0.03 −0.22 5.54
45 0.80 0.26 0.20 0.34 2.64 * −0.02 −0.21 2.87 −2.74 * 0.22 −0.08 −2.88 5.56 * −0.05 −0.12 5.72
49 1.52 0.22 0.19 1.11 1.02 −0.01 −0.09 1.13 −1.41 0.19 −0.13 −1.48 5.45 * −0.07 −0.06 5.58
53 2.71 * 0.17 0.18 2.35 −0.90 −0.02 0.06 −0.94 −0.31 0.17 −0.14 −0.34 5.13 * −0.08 −0.05 5.26
57 3.75 * 0.13 0.17 3.45 −2.62 −0.03 0.24 −2.82 0.59 0.13 −0.11 0.57 4.64 * −0.09 −0.05 4.78
61 4.14 * 0.11 0.17 3.85 −3.72 * −0.05 0.40 −4.06 1.34 0.09 −0.09 1.33 3.97 * −0.10 −0.06 4.13
65 3.77 * 0.11 0.20 3.46 −4.10 * −0.07 0.50 −4.52 2.00 0.06 −0.06 1.99 3.13 * −0.11 −0.07 3.31
Couple
0 0.54 0.60 0.14 −0.19 3.75 0.02 −0.08 3.82 −1.49 0.41 0.01 −1.92 1.50 −0.38 −0.49 2.37
1 0.83 0.27 0.19 0.37 2.61 −0.02 −0.21 2.85 −2.74 * 0.22 −0.08 −2.88 5.63 * −0.05 −0.11 5.79
University
0 0.81 0.27 0.20 0.34 2.62 * −0.02 −0.21 2.86 −2.71 * 0.22 −0.08 −2.85 5.52 * −0.05 −0.11 5.70
1 1.27 0.08 0.10 1.08 1.63 −0.05 0.14 1.54 −1.89 0.12 −0.18 −1.84 1.34 −0.02 0.06 1.30
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Table 6. Cont.
1995–2001 2001–2004 2004–2007 2007–2010
∆D A C R ∆D A C R ∆D A C R ∆D A C R
Income Centile: Age 30
5 −1.59 0.79 0.77 −3.16 3.86 −0.83 −0.89 5.59 −4.42 1.12 0.15 −5.70 5.77 −0.24 0.01 6.00
10 −0.45 0.51 0.61 −1.57 0.88 −0.94 −1.19 3.02 −2.52 0.97 1.00 −4.49 3.93 −0.22 −0.64 4.80
20 0.94 0.37 0.60 −0.04 0.51 −0.71 −1.37 2.60 −2.47 0.77 1.23 −4.47 2.14 −0.19 −0.97 3.30
30 1.63 0.31 0.53 0.78 1.54 −0.47 −1.25 3.26 −3.44 * 0.64 1.14 −5.22 1.67 −0.17 −0.96 2.80
40 2.19 0.26 0.41 1.51 2.89 −0.23 −0.98 4.11 −4.74 * 0.49 0.93 −6.17 1.82 −0.13 −0.81 2.76
50 2.48 0.23 0.30 1.94 3.67 * −0.11 −0.73 4.51 −5.54 * 0.39 0.72 −6.66 2.25 −0.09 −0.65 3.00
60 2.63 0.22 0.22 2.20 3.99 * −0.05 −0.52 4.56 −5.94 * 0.31 0.53 −6.79 2.74 −0.07 −0.50 3.32
70 2.70 0.20 0.14 2.35 3.93 * −0.03 −0.32 4.29 −5.97 * 0.25 0.35 −6.58 3.24 * −0.04 −0.37 3.66
80 2.66 0.19 0.07 2.40 3.29 −0.04 −0.13 3.47 −5.48 * 0.19 0.15 −5.83 3.83 * −0.02 −0.22 4.07
90 2.57 0.16 0.02 2.38 1.68 −0.07 0.02 1.74 −4.17 * 0.15 −0.00 −4.32 4.47 * −0.01 −0.09 4.57
95 2.63 0.13 0.01 2.49 −0.20 −0.09 0.07 −0.17 −2.83 0.11 −0.05 −2.89 4.95 * −0.01 −0.04 5.00
Income Centile: Age 45
5 2.98 0.63 1.36 1.01 −2.75 −0.40 −2.38 0.04 −0.74 0.47 1.74 −2.96 4.83 * −0.35 −0.28 5.47
10 2.39 0.55 0.66 1.17 −2.07 −0.35 −1.46 −0.27 0.18 0.50 0.97 −1.29 4.33 * −0.34 −0.37 5.03
20 2.00 0.44 0.48 1.07 −1.04 −0.20 −0.89 0.06 0.17 0.42 0.32 −0.57 4.44 * −0.20 −0.30 4.94
30 1.67 0.38 0.39 0.90 0.15 −0.11 −0.61 0.88 −0.70 0.35 0.09 −1.14 4.82 * −0.12 −0.22 5.18
40 1.20 0.31 0.28 0.60 1.64 −0.04 −0.36 2.04 −1.92 0.27 −0.04 −2.16 5.30 * −0.07 −0.15 5.52
50 0.80 0.26 0.20 0.33 2.65 * −0.02 −0.21 2.88 −2.76 * 0.22 −0.08 −2.90 5.58 * −0.05 −0.11 5.74
60 0.49 0.22 0.14 0.13 3.31 * −0.01 −0.11 3.43 −3.28 * 0.18 −0.09 −3.37 5.71 * −0.04 −0.08 5.83
70 0.26 0.18 0.09 −0.00 3.66 * −0.01 −0.05 3.73 −3.55 * 0.15 −0.09 −3.61 5.72 * −0.04 −0.05 5.81
80 0.16 0.13 0.05 −0.02 3.61 * −0.01 −0.01 3.64 −3.08 * 0.12 −0.08 −3.58 5.58 * −0.04 −0.03 5.66
90 0.39 0.07 0.03 0.28 2.72 * −0.02 0.00 2.75 −2.46 * 0.09 −0.07 −3.11 5.33 * −0.04 −0.02 5.39
95 0.80 0.03 0.03 0.73 1.40 −0.02 −0.01 1.44 −2.62 0.07 −0.05 −2.48 5.14 * −0.03 −0.03 5.20
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Table 6. Cont.
1995–2001 2001–2004 2004–2007 2007–2010
∆D A C R ∆D A C R ∆D A C R ∆D A C R
Income Centile: Age 60
5 10.21 * 0.49 0.82 8.89 −9.92 * −0.24 −2.26 −7.41 −0.22 0.19 0.88 −1.29 5.72 * −0.09 −0.12 5.94
10 9.94 * 0.44 0.69 8.80 −9.14 * −0.37 −0.48 −8.29 0.26 0.18 0.17 −0.11 5.56 * −0.14 −0.14 5.85
20 8.33 * 0.32 0.48 7.51 −7.41 * −0.24 0.40 −7.56 0.96 0.14 −0.13 0.95 5.47 * −0.14 −0.12 5.72
30 6.92 * 0.24 0.36 6.32 −6.16 * −0.14 0.49 −6.49 1.24 0.12 −0.14 1.26 5.20 * −0.12 −0.10 5.41
40 5.30 * 0.17 0.24 4.89 −4.70 * −0.07 0.44 −5.06 1.28 0.10 −0.11 1.29 4.67 * −0.10 −0.07 4.85
50 4.12 * 0.12 0.18 3.82 −3.56 * −0.05 0.37 −3.88 1.15 0.10 −0.09 1.14 4.17 * −0.10 −0.05 4.33
60 3.23 * 0.08 0.13 3.01 −2.62 * −0.03 0.30 −2.88 0.95 0.10 −0.07 0.92 3.74 * −0.09 −0.04 3.88
70 2.52 * 0.06 0.10 2.35 −1.79 −0.03 0.23 −1.99 0.68 0.11 −0.06 0.64 3.34 * −0.09 −0.03 3.48
80 1.95 0.03 0.08 1.82 −1.01 −0.03 0.15 −1.14 0.25 0.11 −0.05 0.19 2.93 * −0.09 −0.03 3.06
90 1.65 0.02 0.07 1.55 −0.54 −0.04 0.07 −0.56 −0.37 0.10 −0.02 −0.45 2.55 * −0.08 −0.03 2.67
95 1.18 0.02 0.08 1.08 −0.47 −0.05 0.01 −0.42 −0.90 0.08 0.00 −0.91 2.31 * −0.05 −0.02 2.39
Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their median value. In bold is the change in arrears (∆D) over the years (starred when statistically significant at the
5 percent level); then the change attributed to changes Applications (A), changes in Credit Acceptance among applications (C), and changes in Repayment among borrowers (R).
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Table 6 shows that between 2001 and 2004, 29-year-old households increased arrears
by 3.76 percent, and that this change was earlier found to be statistically significant at the
5 percent level. The decomposition exercise shows that changes in application behaviour
reduced arrears by 0.12 percent and that changes in acceptance by lenders reduced arrears
by 0.77 percent. The main cause of the increase in arrears for 29-year-old households
was that there was an increase in arrears among borrowers (the decomposition exercise
shows this would have increased arrears by 4.66 percent). The results for households aged
between 33 and 45 had earlier all shown significant increases in arrears (they all starred in
the table). In all cases, the decomposition exercise shows that this increase in arrears was
despite a reduction in applications (the effect of applications A is negative in each case)
and a reduction in lending to these households (column C shows the effect of acceptance is
also negative). The increase in arrears among these households is driven by a change in
the repayment behaviour of borrowers, shown in column R. While younger households
increased arrears, there was a significant reduction in arrears among older households over
60. The decomposition exercise shows that, while the change in applications has the right
sign, the effect on arrears is tiny. Changes in acceptance behaviour have the wrong sign: it
increases arrears by 0.40 percent among 61-year-old households, and by 0.50 percent among
65-year-old households. The exercise shows that the reduction in arrears for households
over 60 is overwhelmingly because of changes in the behaviour of households who receive
a loan, as shown in column R. Low education households also had a significant increase in
arrears between 2001 and 2004, and the decomposition attributes this increase to a change
in borrower behaviour, rather than to a change in either applications or acceptances.
Between 2004 and 2007, 45-year-old households and younger significantly decreased
arrears while for older households there is a statistically insignificant increase in arrears.
Again, these changes are almost entirely due to changes in non-payment among borrowers
(column R), since there were negligible effects on arrears from changes in the demand for
loans (column A) or in credit acceptance (column C). Couples and non-college-educated
households also significantly reduced their arrears (column D), and the decomposition
exercise shows that the change can be overwhelmingly attributed to changes in arrears
among borrowers (column R).
In 2010, there was an increase in arrears among all households except those under 30,
with the largest increase among middle-aged households. As before, the increase can be
attributed to changes in arrears behaviour among borrowers (the changes in wanting a
loan, or being denied credit, by themselves, contribute to a very small reduction in arrears
as the sign of the effect is negative in column A and column C). Younger households have
a smaller increase in arrears, which would have been much larger if there had not been an
increase in credit refusals, shown in column C. However, if demand and credit acceptance
had not changed, the increase in arrears would still have been smaller than for middle-aged
or older households (see column R). This suggests that the reduction in credit may not
have been aimed at those age-groups, which increased arrears the most. Couples and
non-college households also had a large increase in arrears between 2007 and 2010 (over
5 percent in each case). In both cases, applications and acceptances had the effect of slightly
reducing arrears, but there was a very large change in borrower behaviour, which caused
an overall increase in arrears for these groups.
The results so far suggest that behaviour differs for young and old households (other
variables held at their median). The second half of the table looks at the income distribution
at age 30, age 45 and age 60. It shows that the change in the rate of arrears for young
and middle aged households between 1995 and 2001 is never significant. However, for
old households, the changes are large, positive, and significant for all households at or
below the 70th income centile (these results are starred in the table), and the increase is
larger for lower income households. This increase is mostly attributable to changes in the
behaviour of borrowers (column R), with much smaller changes attributable to changes
in application behaviour (column A) or lending behaviour (column C). For example, at
age 60, applications increase arrears by 0.44 percent for households at the 10th income
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centile, while more generous lending increases their arrears by 0.69 percent. However, the
reduction in repayment among borrowers increases their arrears by 8.80 percent, which is
a much larger effect.
What about the changes between 2001 and 2004, during which the economy recovered
from the dotcom crisis? This period is just prior to the bankruptcy reforms enacted in
2005; recall that Figure 1 shows a sharp spike in bankruptcy filings in 2005. The results
shown in Table 6 show that for 60-year-old households, there was a significant reduction in
arrears for households below the 60th income centile. The decomposition exercise shows
that this reduction in arrears among older households is almost entirely attributable to a
reduction in arrears among borrowers (column R): changes in applications had a very small
effect, while column C shows that there was a reduction in lending to the lowest income
households (which reduced arrears by 2.26 percent for households at the 5th centile), but
that lending actually became more generous for households at or above the 20th income
centile. It seems that, for older households, the decrease in arrears fully reversed the earlier
increase between 1995 and 2001, and moreover, these changes are mostly attributable to
changes in the repayment behaviour of borrowers. However, for middle-aged households,
there was a statistically significant increase in arrears for households between the 50th and
90th income centiles, while for the youngest households, arrears increased for households
between the 50th and 70th income centiles. For these middle-aged and younger households,
column A shows a very small reduction in applications, while column C shows a small
reduction in lending, hence neither can explain the increase in arrears. Rather, column R
shows that the increase in arrears is explained by the worsening repayment behaviour of
households receiving a loan.
After the enactment of the bankruptcy reforms in 2005, Figure 1 shows a sharp
reduction in bankruptcy filings in 2006 and 2007. However, our results show that the
change in arrears between 2004 and 2007 is never significant for older households (and the
point estimates of the change are small). The reduction in arrears was instead concentrated
on younger households between the 30th and 90th income centiles, and on middle-aged
households between the 50th and 90th income centiles. Perhaps surprisingly, these are
mostly the households which had increased arrears between 2001 and 2004. For younger
households between 2004 and 2007, the decomposition exercise shows that the reduction
in arrears is not due to changes in either application or lending behaviour (column A
shows that applications are increasing arrears, while column C shows that lenders became
more generous in giving loans to younger households). For middle-aged households, an
increase in applications again had the effect of slightly increasing arrears, while there was
a negligible reduction in arrears resulting from changes in lender behaviour. Column R
shows that the overall change in arrears between 2004 and 2007 can be attributed to changes
in the repayment behaviour of borrowers. Given that an aim of the bankruptcy reform of
2005 was to encourage higher income households to repay their debts, it seems that the
reforms succeeded in their aim among middle-aged and younger households. Moreover,
the reforms had remarkably little effect on lender behaviour.
The rate of arrears shown in Figure 1 sharply increased in 2010. This increase has
often been attributed to lower income households receiving credit hitherto refused, and
consequently defaulting on their debts (hence the sub-prime crisis). The regression results
reported earlier also show that between 2007 and 2010, there was a significant increase in
arrears across all income groups for middle-aged and older households, and for households
above the 70th income centile among younger households (this is shown by starring the
change in arrears in Table 6). The size of the change among 60-year-old households
was larger for lower income households than higher income households; but there were
rather smaller differences across income groups among 45-year-old households. The
decomposition exercise shows that applications and acceptances (columns A and C) had a
negligible effect on arrears (and the sign in both cases is negative). For all income levels,
the change in arrears is fully attributable to changes in arrears among borrowers, shown
in column R. Table 6 shows that the change in arrears between 2007 and 2010 for young
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2021, 14, 43 22 of 40
lower-income households is not significant. The decomposition exercise shows that if
only the behaviour of borrowers changed, then the overall increase in arrears of these
households would have been larger than it was (but still smaller than for higher income
30-year-olds), but that a reduction in the granting of credit roughly halved the change in
the rate of arrears for households between the 20th and 40th centile. The increase in arrears
does not fully support the story about sub-prime lending driving arrears, for two reasons.
First, except among the oldest households, the increase in arrears is not larger among
lower income households; in fact, for younger households, it is the wealthier households
who have increased their rate of arrears. Second, the decomposition exercise suggests that
the increase in arrears can not really be attributed to either increases in applications or
acceptances.
The results reported in this section suggest, rather surprisingly, that most of the
changes in arrears over time are due to dramatic fluctuations in the repayment behaviour of
borrowers rather than to changes in the composition of the borrower population. Studying
all three major events (the two recessions and the bankruptcy reform) together has enabled
us to see that this feature is common to all three events: the change in the repayment
of borrowers explains the increase in arrears of poorer older households between 1995
and 2001 and their reduction in arrears between 2001 and 2004; it explains the increase in
arrears of middle-income younger and middle-aged households between 2001 and 2004,
and their reduction in arrears in 2007; and it largely explains the increase in arrears for all
households (except young low-income households) between 2007 and 2010.
6. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the arrears behaviour of US households between 1995 and
2013, using data on loan and repayment behaviour from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
The SCF is a survey of US households, and does not include information regarding the
lender, and hence, the study has little to say about the banking sector. Moreover, the
analysis of behaviour is not explicitly based on any underlying theoretical behavioural
model, but attempts, rather, to describe what the household actually does. The raw data
show that arrears increased during the dot-com recession at the beginning of the 21st
century, fell in the years immediately following, and then sharply increased during the
more recent sub-prime recession. By running fully non-parametric regressions, the analysis
is able to explore the differing experiences of different sub-groups of the population.
In particular, the non-parametric regressions allow for highly non-linear responses by
households, as well as complicated interactions between variables such as age and income.
The results show that the increase in arrears in the years leading up to the dot-com recession
was concentrated on older households (e.g., households in their fifties and sixties), and
especially lower income older households. These older households reduced their arrears
between 2001 and 2004, while younger households (especially younger middle-income
households) increased their arrears during these years. Between 2004 and 2007, there was
a sharp reduction in arrears, but this reduction was concentrated on households aged 45
or younger (especially those at and above average incomes). Lastly, the sharp increase
in arrears since the sub-prime crisis has been experienced by all but the youngest lowest
income households.
A major contribution of this paper has been to decompose the change in rates of
arrears into a contribution from changes in applications, from changes in acceptances, and
from changes in repayment among borrowers. Dell’Arricia et al. (2012) and Athreya et al.
(2015) have argued that there was a change in application behaviour. In contrast, Mian
and Sufi Mian and Sufi (2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert Demyanyk and Hemert (2011)
and Mayer, Pence and Sherland Mayer et al. (2009) emphasise the role of changes in
lender behaviour. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the decomposition exercise suggests that
most of the changes in arrears between waves are the result of changes in the behaviour of
borrowers rather than changes in the composition of the borrower population. Studying the
entire span from 1995 to 2013 shows that this feature is consistent across all the major events
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that affected households during this period (and indeed, this is an important motivation for
studying the whole period rather than each major event separately). In both the dot-com
recession, and the sub-prime crisis, the increase in arrears is little changed by changes
in the application or acceptance rate of those groups who significantly increased their
incidence of arrears (preliminary parametric results show that changes in demographics
did not play a large role). However, the fact that younger and middle-aged lower income
households did not increase their arrears appears to be partly because lenders reduced
these households’ access to credit (which seems to have reversed in 2007).
The two most important events during the period studied in this paper are the
Bankruptcy Reform of 2005 and the sub-prime crisis at the end of the decade. The
bankruptcy reform had the aim of reducing default and non-payment from high income
households who could reasonably afford to repay their debts. By comparing changes in
arrears among households in 2004 and 2007, this paper has shown that these objectives
seem largely to have been achieved. The paper shows that there was little change in
either applications or acceptances by lenders between these two years (if anything, poorer
households had their access to credit improved). However, there was a sharp and signifi-
cant reduction in arrears among households over the 30th income centile for 30-year-old
households, and among households above median income for 45-year-old households.
Perhaps surprisingly, there seems to have been no significant effect on the arrears of older
households, even those higher income households which were the target of the reforms.
The second key event affecting US households during the study period is the serious
recession resulting from the sub-prime crisis. Much of the literature on mortgage credit ar-
gues that changes in acceptances were a key cause of the sub-prime recession, while Livshits
et al. (2010) and White (2007) argue that there was a more general increase in credit to house-
holds. Athreya et al. (2015) argue that there had been a change in application behaviour.
The results reported here, although they include non-housing debts, and do not report the
size of the loan, do not seem to support this general conclusion: the decomposition exercise
attributes almost all the change in arrears among those groups who significantly increased
their rate of arrears to changes in borrower behaviour. Guiso et al. (2013) have argued that
there was an increase in households willingness to default, and the results in this paper
support their view.
The results reported in this paper have shown that the rate of repayment among
borrowers has changed dramatically over the years. However, one might worry that this
is being driven by changes in the composition of borrowers. For example, if households
hitherto refused credit are given a loan, then these new borrower households might be
expected to have much higher default rates than the existing pool of borrowers, causing
the average rate of arrears among borrowers to become worse. However, this hypothesis
does not seem to explain the changes in arrears during the sample period. For example,
between 2004 and 2007, there was an increase in the level of borrowing at the same time
as there was a reduction in arrears among borrowers. Similarly, between 2007 and 2010,
there was a reduction in both application and acceptances at the same time as an increase
in arrears. In both these examples, including or excluding marginal borrowers (who would
be expected to have worse rates of repayment) cannot explain the change in the average
behaviour of borrower households. The changes between 2001 and 2004 also cannot be
explained by these compositional changes, except perhaps for the lowest income older
households, since changes in the pool of borrowers has the opposite sign to changes in the
arrears of borrowers. While there was a significant increase in arrears among borrowers
between 1995 and 2001 for older borrowers, and a concurrent increase in borrowing among
these borrowers, the later change was much too small to account for the former change.
Hence, the paper concludes that most of the changes in arrears between waves really are
driven by changes in borrower behaviour rather than in the composition of the borrowing
population.
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Appendix A. Additional Supporting Material: Parametric Estimates
The regression results used for the parametric decomposition exercise are presented
in the tables below. Table A1 shows the estimates for each wave of the data for repayment
among those households who are currently borrowing. It shows that younger households
(except in 1995) and lower income households are less likely to repay on schedule, and
homeowners, except in 2007, are more likely to repay on schedule. Table A2 reports whether
a household has received a loan. It shows that younger households and middle-to-higher
income households are more likely to receive a loan, as are homeowners. Table A3 shows
whether a household has applied for a loan. The table shows that younger households and
middle-to-higher income households are more likely to apply for a loan, as are homeown-
ers. These estimates are used in the paper to describe how the behaviour of households
and lenders has been changing over time, and to describe the main contribution of each
component of the decomposition exercise in explaining the changes in arrears over time.
Table A1. Probability of Repaying Among Borrowers.
1995 2001 2004 2007 2010
Age 25–34 −0.196 −1.267 ** −0.592 ** −0.216 −0.257
(0.227) (0.406) (0.197) (0.197) (0.144)
Age 35–44 −0.146 −1.025 * −0.624 ** −0.352 −0.593 **
(0.228) (0.408) (0.193) (0.193) (0.136)
Age 45–54 −0.122 −1.154 ** −0.300 −0.361 −0.519 **
(0.231) (0.407) (0.198) (0.191) (0.134)
Age 55–64 0.167 −1.210 ** −0.024 −0.146 −0.274 *
(0.270) (0.411) (0.218) (0.200) (0.140)
Income Decile 1–2 −0.897 ** −1.440 ** −1.531 ** −1.862 ** −1.133 **
(0.315) (0.366) (0.345) (0.341) (0.159)
Income Decile 3–4 −0.715 * −1.325 ** −1.346 ** −1.695 ** −0.885 **
(0.302) (0.356) (0.337) (0.334) (0.151)
Income Decile 5–6 −0.602 * −1.091 ** −1.299 ** −1.368 ** −0.626 **
(0.293) (0.352) (0.329) (0.330) (0.148)
Income Decile 7–8 −0.329 −0.649 −0.886 ** −1.037 ** −0.478 **
(0.300) (0.355) (0.333) (0.329) (0.146)
couple 0.148 −0.179 −0.006 0.369 * −0.030
(0.179) (0.162) (0.139) (0.144) (0.104)
gender −0.061 −0.020 −0.167 0.348 * −0.090
(0.171) (0.157) (0.129) (0.140) (0.098)
college 0.247 0.164 0.141 0.137 0.277 **
(0.133) (0.127) (0.107) (0.116) (0.078)
white 0.211 0.189 0.020 −0.090 0.085
(0.114) (0.103) (0.093) (0.103) (0.066)
household size −0.110 ** −0.058 −0.059 −0.105 ** −0.044
(0.042) (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.026)
homeowner 0.575 ** 0.440 ** 0.530 ** 0.189 0.197 **
(0.112) (0.105) (0.093) (0.105) (0.071)
Constant 1.852 ** 3.517 ** 2.945 ** 2.712 ** 2.374 **
(0.467) (0.611) (0.458) (0.455) (0.265)
N 1680 2025 2265 2520 3610
test: Age 3.21 12.71 25.61 5.59 31.78
(prob) 0.523 0.013 0.000 0.232 0.000
test: Income 12.55 31.99 29.27 47.13 64.71
(prob) 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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Table A2. Probability of Borrowing Among Applicants.
1995 2001 2004 2007 2010
Age 25–34 0.634 ** 0.413 * 0.479 ** 0.535 ** 0.605 **
(0.151) (0.172) (0.148) (0.157) (0.121)
Age 35–44 0.545 ** 0.364 * 0.532 ** 0.431 ** 0.639 **
(0.149) (0.164) (0.142) (0.145) (0.119)
Age 45–54 0.430 ** 0.175 0.633 ** 0.433 ** 0.404 **
(0.146) (0.154) (0.139) (0.134) (0.105)
Age 55–64 0.275 0.186 0.237 0.333 ** 0.254 *
(0.154) (0.162) (0.126) (0.124) (0.102)
Income Decile 1−2 −0.381 * 0.019 −0.133 −0.412 * −0.036
(0.182) (0.182) (0.167) (0.162) (0.126)
Income Decile 3–4 −0.105 0.195 0.029 −0.031 0.035
(0.171) (0.165) (0.152) (0.152) (0.117)
Income Decile 5–6 0.138 0.407 * 0.511 ** 0.246 0.435 **
(0.165) (0.160) (0.151) (0.148) (0.118)
Income Decile 7–8 0.134 0.590 ** 0.269 * 0.437 ** 0.372 **
(0.170) (0.154) (0.131) (0.141) (0.110)
couple 0.213 0.048 −0.273 * −0.072 0.142
(0.134) (0.147) (0.132) (0.143) (0.100)
gender 0.152 0.023 −0.024 −0.012 0.246 *
(0.129) (0.138) (0.127) (0.140) (0.098)
college 0.210 * 0.046 −0.006 −0.239 * −0.094
(0.106) (0.112) (0.100) (0.102) (0.077)
white 0.186 −0.266 * −0.005 −0.068 −0.059
(0.096) (0.116) (0.097) (0.109) (0.074)
household size 0.054 0.019 0.085 * 0.040 0.002
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.028)
homeowner 0.874 ** 0.565 ** 0.721 ** 0.315 ** 0.724 **
(0.094) (0.106) (0.103) (0.111) (0.080)
Constant −0.418 0.728 * 0.415 1.086 ** 0.130
(0.303) (0.345) (0.305) (0.314) (0.228)
N 1914 2176 2467 2676 3917
test: Age 19.38 7.72 24.53 15.42 35.64
(prob) 0.001 0.102 0.000 0.004 0.000
test: Income 18.79 23.34 26.62 34.14 34.76
(prob) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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Table A3. Probability of Applying for a Loan.
1995 2001 2004 2007 2010
Age 25–34 1.490 ** 1.259 ** 1.053 ** 0.950 ** 0.860 **
(0.112) (0.120) (0.117) (0.119) (0.087)
Age 35–44 1.317 ** 1.154 ** 1.069 ** 0.660 ** 0.830 **
(0.109) (0.111) (0.112) (0.106) (0.085)
Age 45–54 1.226 ** 1.051 ** 0.865 ** 0.539 ** 0.710 **
(0.105) (0.103) (0.099) (0.094) (0.076)
Age 55–64 0.758 ** 0.688 ** 0.559 ** 0.445 ** 0.370 **
(0.103) (0.102) (0.093) (0.088) (0.071)
Income Decile 1–2 −0.665 ** −0.384 ** −0.431 ** −0.293 * −0.232 *
(0.133) (0.132) (0.127) (0.117) (0.092)
Income Decile 3–4 −0.140 0.287 * 0.083 0.157 0.175 *
(0.126) (0.128) (0.122) (0.111) (0.088)
Income Decile 5–6 0.144 0.361 ** 0.348 ** 0.469 ** 0.529 **
(0.123) (0.122) (0.115) (0.111) (0.089)
Income Decile 7–8 0.097 0.445 ** 0.566 ** 0.459 ** 0.545 **
(0.123) (0.119) (0.117) (0.100) (0.088)
couple 0.057 0.230 * 0.007 −0.001 0.166 *
(0.108) (0.107) (0.099) (0.100) (0.074)
gender 0.051 0.121 0.195 * 0.121 0.227 **
(0.104) (0.099) (0.096) (0.099) (0.070)
college −0.152 −0.067 −0.024 0.004 0.047
(0.081) (0.083) (0.083) (0.075) (0.059)
white 0.029 0.156 0.165 * 0.188 * 0.155 **
(0.081) (0.081) (0.074) (0.074) (0.053)
household size 0.046 0.046 0.026 0.071 * 0.024
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021)
homeowner 0.712 ** 0.524 ** 0.635 ** 0.635 ** 0.652 **
(0.080) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080) (0.059)
Constant −0.648 ** −0.792 ** −0.564 * −0.455 * −0.717 **
(0.236) (0.239) (0.232) (0.219) (0.164)
N 2442 2619 2925 3140 4768
test: Age 222.97 152.57 118.79 71.15 136.12
(prob) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
test: Income 72.48 89.89 96.89 80.56 151.34
(prob) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
Appendix B. Additional Supporting Material: Non-Parametric Estimates
This section reports fuller results for arrears, for loan applications by households and
for loan acceptances by lenders (these results are summarized in the paper). The effect of
the household characteristics on arrears is estimated using the Nadarya–Watson kernel
estimator, defined as
∑j 6=i Dj I(xj ∈ Xn)K([xi − xj]/an)
∑j 6=i I(xj ∈ Xn)K([xi − xj]/an)
where I(·) is the indicator function for whether the jth observation is in the Xn neighbour-
hood of household i, K(·) is the Gaussian kernel function, Xn = {x s.t. ||x− x′|| ≤ 2an
for some x′ ∈ X} and an is positive, tends to zero and is chosen through cross-validation
(see Härdle et al. (1988)). Similar estimates can be obtained for applications and acceptances.
The variances of the kernel estimators are constructed using Bowman and Azzalini (1997).
Appendix B.1. Arrears Behaviour
The first regression results which are reported include age, income, a dummy for
whether the household is a couple, and a dummy for whether the household head has a
university degree; it investigates how the explanatory variables explain the level of arrears
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observed in the sample, with separate regressions for each wave of the data from 1995 to
2013. These results, which report the level of arrears among all households, are available
from the author, and are presented in the top panel of Figure 2. In every year included
in the analysis, arrears are higher at younger ages than at older ages. For example, in
1995, rates of arrears are significantly higher for households at age 25 than at age 45; and
households at age 45, in turn, have significantly higher arrears than households at age 65.
In fact, the youngest age-group is significantly more likely to be in arrears than the oldest
age-group in every wave of the survey. Arrears rates for each age-group is slowly changing
from year-to-year. In 2001 (the year of the dot-com crisis), the arrears rate was significantly
higher than in 1995 for households aged 53 and above. At age 65, for example, the rate of
arrears has increased from 2.72% of households to 6.52% of households.
In 2004, arrears are higher among households under 45, than in 1998 or 1995, but older
households are now no longer likely to enter arrears than in earlier years: in fact repayment
rates are significantly higher among households age 57 and over in 2004 than in 2001.8 The
rates of arrears among these younger households recovered in 2007 (in each case, arrears
was significantly lower in 2007 than in 2004), with rates of arrears similar to those in 2001
and earlier. Older household rates of arrears are not significantly different to earlier years.
Recall that households were surveyed in 2007 before the sub-prime crisis had started, but
after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 had tried to make bankruptcy more difficult for
those with above median levels of income. The subprime crisis was fully underway by
2010 (the NBER recession dates are given as late 2007 until mid-2009) and the figure shows
that compared to 2007, rates of arrears had increased significantly at all age groups over
the age of 35; and remained high in 2013, with rates of arrears having yet to recover. The
preliminary conclusion from this analysis is that arrears increased among middle-aged and
older households both in the dotcom recession and in the subprime crisis, and that arrears
among younger households had been especially high just prior to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2005, but otherwise are no worse at the end of the period than the beginning.
The effect of income on arrears (at age 45 and holding the other variables at their
median value) is reported in the bottom panel of Figure 2. In 1995, over 10% of households
at the 5th centile of income (e.g., households at the bottom of the income range) are in
arrears but only 3% percent of households at the 95th centile are in arrears. These differences
are statistically significant: high income households at the top of the distribution are less
likely to enter arrears than households with median or lower income, and households at
the 10th centile of income are more likely to be in arrears than households higher than the
60th centile of income. The results in 1998 and 2001 are very similar (the differences in
between the two waves is not significant).
In 2004, there was a sharp increase in arrears, with the increase focused on middle
income and higher income households (the increase is statistically significant, compared to
1995, for all households between the 50th and 90th centile of the income distribution). The
fact that the increase in arrears was among these income groups explains the focus that the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, placed on making it more difficult for these households
to escape their debts. Indeed, in 2007, there was a sharp and statistically significant fall
in rates of arrears among middle and higher income households compared to 2004: rates
of arrears had returned to those observed in earlier years, suggesting that the Act had
succeeded in its objectives.
However, the rebound in rates of arrears in 2007 is not the end of the story. There was
a sharp increase in rates of arrears in 2010, associated with the subprime crisis. However,
this increase encompassed all income groups similarly: low, middle, and high income
groups all increased arrears by around 6%, even though higher income groups are unlikely
to be sub-prime borrowers. In the small recovery in 2013, there is statistically insignificant
recovery. This is despite the fact that by 2013, the US economy was no longer in recession.
8 This kind of nuance would not be easy to see without using a non-parametric regression, which places no functional form assumptions on the effect
of age and year on rates of arrears.
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The differences between couples and non-couples are never significant, and only
significant between education groups in the last two waves. This changed in 2010, when
college-educated households became significantly more likely to repay. The changes
over time are not for college educated households. However, non-college households
significantly increased arrears in 2004, recovered in 2007, before there was a sharp increase
in arrears among these households in 2010 and 2013.
Appendix B.2. Application Behaviour
Recall that Dell’Arricia et al. (2012) argued that there was a change in application
behaviour. Figure 3 shows how application behaviour has been changing. The top panel
differences between age groups are insignificant (other variables held at the median).
However, there was an increase in the desire for credit over time. Significantly more
households desired credit in 1998 than in 1995 (there was a 3 percent increase at younger
ages, and a 4 percent increase at older ages); and in 2007, the demand for credit was
significantly higher than in 2004. The demand for credit then fell significantly in 2010
for the oldest households, and had fallen back to 2004 levels for all households by 2013.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that lower income households are less likely to apply
for credit than high income households, with these differences across income groups
being significant in every survey year. Moreover, the proportion of households wanting
credit. In 1998 and 2001, the proportion of households that wanted credit was larger
for lower income households: in 1998, households at the 10th centile increased by over
7.8%, while households at the 90th income centile increased by over 2.7% (the difference
was significant for all households from the 10th income centile). There was a small but
statistically insignificant decline in the desire for credit in 2004, before the desire for credit
recovered in 2007, where the increase was concentrated in poorer households: households
at the 20th centile increased by 4.4%, while households at the 70th centile increased by
1.6% (the increase, compared to 2004, was significant for households between the 20th and
70th centile). Note that the Bankruptcy Act, by making default more onerous, predicts that
fewer households should apply for credit; but this is not what has been found here. In the
last two waves of the survey, there has been a decline in households reporting that they
would like a loan, and this decline, compared to 2007, has become significant by 2013.
It is also interesting to look at the differences across the income distribution at age 30
and age 60 (available on request). At age 30 in 1995, 88.6% households at the bottom of
the income distribution want a loan, while 95.3% of households at the top of the income
distribution want a loan (these differences are statistically significant). Similarly, the
difference between the low and high income 60-year-olds (from 83.2% of households to
94.9% of households) is also significant. However, changes over time are more interesting.
The proportion of 30-year-old households who want a loan significantly increased in 1998
at all income levels, and this high level is maintained in 2001. In 2004 (the period covered
by the sub-prime crisis), there is a large and significant fall among the lowest income
30-year-old households (from 94.9% to 86.0%), but the rather smaller fall among middle
income households (from 95.5% to 94.6%) and higher income households have not changed
significantly. There was a recovery in the demand for credit in 2007 at all income levels,
which is significant for the lowest income households: the level of demand looks similar to
results for 1998 and 2001. While low income 30-year-old households also reduced demand
in 2010 and 2013, although these falls are not statistically significant. Results for 60-year-old
households, similarly, show there is a large and statistically significant increase in the
demand for credit between 1995 and 1998 among the lowest income households from
83.2% to 94.4%, and an insignificant increase at higher incomes. However, the decline in
credit demand in 2004 was similar across at all income-groups and statistically insignificant.
Among 60-year-old households, high income households increased demand from 94.3%
to 98.0% in 2007, while low income households increased demand from 90.9% to 94.7%,
but the result is only statistically significant for the high income group. There was then a
significant fall in the demand for credit among these higher income groups in 2010.
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Appendix B.3. Acceptance Behaviour
Figure 4 describes the rate at which credit applications are accepted by the lender. In
the early years of the sample, younger households are significantly more likely to get the
credit they want than older households, as there is a sharp drop-off in credit acceptance of
households in the fifties and sixties (the oldest households are 11.8 percent less likely to get
credit than the youngest households in 1995). In 1998 and 2001 there is a steady increase
in the availability of credit to all age-groups, but this increase was larger for these older
households (credit to 65-year-old households who want credit increased by 6.1 percent,
while credit to 29-year-old households only increased by 3.2 percent). In the 2004 recession,
credit to older households continued to increase, while credit to the youngest households
sharply declined: consequently households in their sixties and now more likely to get the
credit they want than households in their twenties. There was a recovery in acceptance
rates to these younger households in 2007. In 2010 and 2013, households of all ages saw
a decline in credit acceptance, but the falls are largest (and only statistically significant)
for younger households. In 2010 and 2013, credit acceptance was highest for middle-aged
households and lowest for the youngest households, with the difference between these
two age groups being significant.
In all years, low income households are significantly less likely to get the credit they
want than high income households. At the top of the income distribution, there is no
statistical difference in credit acceptance over the years: changes in credit acceptance
are concentrated in middle and low income households. For example, middle income
households are 2.8 percent more likely to get credit in 2001 than in 1995, while households at
the 10th income centile are 5.4 percent more likely to get credit in 2001 (although the higher
variance of the low income estimates mean this difference in not statistically significant).
Credit acceptance declined in 2004 for all households below the 50th centile, with the
declines much larger for the lowest income households, and failed to recover much in 2007.
The results in 2010 and 2013 are similar to those in 2004.
What about differences across income groups for younger and older households?
These are available on request from the author. At age 30, there are large and statistically
significant differences in acceptance rates between low and middle income households
and between middle income and high income households in every wave of the survey.
Similarly for 60-year-old households, higher income households are significantly more
likely to receive the credit they want than lower income households. Among 30-year-old
households, the acceptance rate did not change at any income level between 1995 and 1998,
but there was an increase in the acceptance rate for households between the 20th and 60th
centiles of the income distribution in 2001, which was reversed in the downturn of 2004. In
2007, young households between the 20th and 60th centiles of the distribution again saw
an increase in their acceptance rate for credit, which was again reversed in the recession
in 2010 (and 2013 was similar to 2010). The pattern of changes over time is different for
60-year-old households: there is no significant difference in credit acceptance between
1995, 1998 and 2001, but credit acceptance significantly improved in 2004 for households
between the 40th and 80th centiles of the income distribution compared to earlier years
with no further improvement in 2007. Moreover, there was no decline in credit acceptance
for these older households in the sub-prime years (e.g., 2010 or 2013). It seems that there
are clear differences across age levels in the way lenders reacted in both recessions covered
by the data.
Appendix C. Additional Supporting Material: Non-Parametric Estimates
This section reports the results for arrears, and for loan applications by households and
loan acceptances by lenders in more detail (a summary of these results is described in the
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paper). The effect of the household characteristics on arrears E(Di|Xi) is estimated using
the Nadarya–Watson kernel estimator of the probability of default, which is defined as
∑j 6=i Dj I(xj ∈ Xn)K([xi − xj]/an)
∑j 6=i I(xj ∈ Xn)K([xi − xj]/an)
where I(·) is the indicator function for whether the jth observation is in the Xn neighbour-
hood of household i, K(·) is the Gaussian kernel function, Xn = {x s.t. ||x− x′|| ≤ 2an
for some x′ ∈ X} and an is positive, tends to zero and is chosen through cross-validation
(see Härdle et al. (1988)). Similar estimates can be obtained for applications and acceptances.
The variances of the kernel estimators are constructed using Bowman and Azzalini (1997)
(see also Pagan and Ullah (1999)).
Appendix C.1. Arrears Behaviour
The first regression results that are reported include age, income, a dummy for whether
the household is a couple, and a dummy for whether the household head has a university
degree; it investigates how the explanatory variables explain the level of arrears observed
in the sample with separate regressions for each wave of the data from 1995 to 2013. These
results, which report the level of arrears among all households, are tabulated at the top
of Table A4. The top panel of Figure 2 shows how the age-profile of arrears has changed
for each of the years included in the study. In every year included in the analysis, arrears
are higher at younger ages than at older ages. For example, in 1995, rates of arrears are
significantly higher for households at age 25 than at age 45; and households at age 45 in
turn have significantly higher arrears than households at age 65. In fact, the youngest
age group is significantly more likely to be in arrears than the oldest age group in every
wave of the survey. Middle-aged households have intermediate rates of arrears (except in
2007, where their arrears are slightly, but not significantly, higher than for the youngest
households). Arrears rates for each age-group is slowly changing from year-to-year. While
the difference between 1995 and 1998 is not significant, by 2001 (the year of the dot-com
crisis) the arrears rate is significantly higher than in 1995 for households aged 53 and above
(the differences at younger ages are not significant). At age 65, for example, the rate of
arrears has increased from 2.72% of households to 6.52% of households.
Moving to 2004, arrears are now higher among the youngest households (those
households under 45 are significantly more likely to report arrears in 2004 than in 1998
or 1995), but older households are now no longer likely to enter arrears than in earlier
years: in fact, repayment rates are significantly higher among households age 57 and over
in 2004 than in 2001. The rates of arrears among these younger households recovered
in 2007 (in each case arrears was significantly lower in 2007 than in 2004), with rates of
arrears similar to those in 2001 and earlier. Older households rates of arrears are also
not significantly different to earlier years. Recall that households were surveyed in 2007
before the sub-prime crisis had started, but after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, had
tried to make bankruptcy more difficult for those with above median levels of income.
The subprime crisis was fully underway by 2010 (the NBER recession dates are given as
late 2007 until mid-2009) and the figure shows that compared to 2007, rates of arrears
had increased significantly at all age-groups over the age of 35 (the difference was not
significant at younger ages). These rates of arrears remained high in 2013, with rates of
arrears for older households having yet to recover. The preliminary conclusion from this
analysis is that arrears increased among middle-aged and older households, both in the
dot-com recession and in the subprime crisis, and that arrears among younger households
had been especially high just prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, but otherwise
are no worse at the end of the period than the beginning.
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Table A4. Estimates of Arrears for 1995–2013.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Age
25 9.50 8.71 11.96 15.94 10.23 11.08 12.32
(1.09) (1.11) (1.25) (1.48) (1.18) (0.99) (1.16)
29 9.43 8.25 11.73 15.85 9.63 11.88 12.26
(0.93) (0.91) (1.06) (1.25) (0.98) (0.86) (0.97)
33 9.18 7.74 10.96 15.26 9.02 12.65 12.20
(0.84) (0.80) (0.93) (1.10) (0.86) (0.80) (0.87)
37 8.68 7.21 9.73 14.04 8.41 13.22 12.17
(0.78) (0.73) (0.85) (1.01) (0.79) (0.77) (0.82)
41 7.89 6.77 8.40 12.26 7.80 13.37 12.07
(0.75) (0.71) (0.79) (0.93) (0.75) (0.76) (0.79)
45 6.85 6.52 7.38 10.17 7.14 13.00 11.75
(0.72) (0.73) (0.76) (0.87) (0.72) (0.75) (0.77)
49 5.66 6.49 6.98 8.06 6.44 12.19 11.13
(0.70) (0.77) (0.78) (0.81) (0.70) (0.74) (0.75)
53 4.48 6.48 7.09 6.14 5.74 11.13 10.32
(0.67) (0.83) (0.85) (0.76) (0.70) (0.74) (0.75)
57 3.53 6.21 7.28 4.52 5.11 9.98 9.52
(0.66) (0.89) (0.94) (0.72) (0.73) (0.76) (0.77)
61 2.94 5.61 7.12 3.22 4.63 8.82 8.85
(0.69) (0.97) (1.07) (0.70) (0.79) (0.81) (0.83)
65 2.72 4.81 6.52 2.23 4.31 7.69 8.34
(0.79) (1.08) (1.23) (0.71) (0.91) (0.90) (0.96)
Income Centile
5 10.68 10.73 12.74 10.65 8.82 15.00 12.35
(2.46) (2.38) (2.30) (2.20) (2.02) (1.69) (1.72)
10 10.17 10.31 11.92 10.31 9.71 15.04 12.41
(1.67) (1.68) (1.69) (1.62) (1.51) (1.27) (1.25)
20 9.17 8.82 10.69 9.95 9.68 14.67 12.55
(1.15) (1.17) (1.24) (1.20) (1.15) (0.99) (0.98)
30 8.42 7.84 9.69 10.11 9.05 14.25 12.48
(0.95) (0.96) (1.03) (1.04) (0.98) (0.87) (0.88)
40 7.55 6.99 8.41 10.29 8.03 13.62 12.16
(0.80) (0.81) (0.86) (0.93) (0.83) (0.79) (0.80)
50 6.85 6.49 7.37 10.23 7.15 12.99 11.76
(0.72) (0.73) (0.76) (0.88) (0.75) (0.75) (0.77)
60 6.21 6.13 6.48 9.96 6.39 12.35 11.28
(0.68) (0.69) (0.69) (0.84) (0.69) (0.73) (0.75)
70 5.56 5.80 5.66 9.46 5.65 11.62 10.68
(0.66) (0.68) (0.65) (0.83) (0.65) (0.72) (0.74)
80 4.74 5.36 4.80 8.50 4.75 10.59 9.70
(0.66) (0.69) (0.63) (0.84) (0.63) (0.75) (0.76)
90 3.77 4.64 4.13 6.89 3.63 9.23 8.06
(0.73) (0.78) (0.69) (0.90) (0.66) (0.85) (0.83)
95 3.06 3.80 3.87 5.26 2.64 8.08 6.30
(0.87) (0.92) (0.85) (1.01) (0.72) (1.04) (0.95)
Couple
0 7.43 9.04 7.30 11.31 9.28 11.28 10.11
(1.05) (1.07) (0.92) (1.12) (1.09) (0.89) (0.94)
1 6.86 6.56 7.37 10.22 7.15 12.98 11.74
(0.72) (0.72) (0.76) (0.88) (0.74) (0.74) (0.76)
University
0 6.84 6.52 7.38 10.22 7.15 13.01 11.75
(0.72) (0.73) (0.76) (0.87) (0.74) (0.75) (0.77)
1 4.48 5.81 5.66 7.33 5.39 6.79 7.03
(1.03) (1.15) (1.10) (1.25) (1.08) (0.93) (0.96)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their
median value.
The effect of income on arrears (at age 45 and holding the other variables at their median
value) is reported in the bottom panel of Figure 2, and tabulated in Table A4. In 1995, over
10% of households at the 5th centile of income (e.g., households at the bottom of the income
range) are in arrears, but only 3% percent of households at the 95th centile are in arrears.
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2021, 14, 43 32 of 40
These differences across income groups are significant: the high-income households at the top
of the distribution are significantly less likely to enter arrears than households with median or
lower income, and households at the 10th centile of income are more likely to be in arrears
than households higher than the 60th centile of income. The results in 1998 and 2001 are
very similar (the differences in rates of arrears at each decile between the two waves are not
significant). The 2001 result was during the dot-com recession.
Table A5. Arrears at Different Income Centiles for Young and Old.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Income Centile: Age 30
5 12.67 13.51 9.61 16.03 9.20 16.18 13.68
(2.36) (2.28) (2.13) (2.68) (2.09) (1.96) (1.96)
10 13.27 12.54 11.91 14.73 10.36 15.17 12.95
(1.79) (1.66) (1.74) (1.88) (1.60) (1.39) (1.38)
20 12.76 11.00 13.09 14.93 11.13 13.80 12.68
(1.34) (1.23) (1.39) (1.45) (1.27) (1.05) (1.09)
30 11.81 9.93 12.98 15.52 11.01 13.08 12.67
(1.14) (1.06) (1.22) (1.32) (1.13) (0.94) (1.00)
40 10.48 8.86 12.32 15.90 10.34 12.47 12.54
(0.98) (0.93) (1.08) (1.23) (1.03) (0.87) (0.95)
50 9.39 8.10 11.58 15.74 9.56 12.07 12.24
(0.90) (0.87) (1.02) (1.20) (0.97) (0.85) (0.94)
60 8.46 7.45 10.83 15.21 8.75 11.71 11.81
(0.86) (0.84) (0.99) (1.19) (0.95) (0.86) (0.95)
70 7.57 6.75 10.01 14.27 7.87 11.30 11.22
(0.84) (0.84) (0.98) (1.21) (0.94) (0.90) (0.98)
80 6.51 5.77 8.92 12.52 6.70 10.68 10.28
(0.87) (0.86) (1.02) (1.27) (0.97) (0.99) (1.05)
90 5.33 4.37 7.66 9.64 5.18 9.76 8.86
(1.02) (0.96) (1.20) (1.42) (1.07) (1.25) (1.26)
95 4.41 3.13 6.85 6.92 3.85 8.90 7.49
(1.30) (1.12) (1.53) (1.65) (1.25) (1.68) (1.59)
Income Centile: Age 60
5 5.82 5.31 16.23 5.58 4.83 11.26 7.71
(2.22) (2.32) (3.14) (2.03) (1.89) (1.98) (1.73)
10 5.21 6.30 15.15 5.64 5.58 11.90 8.76
(1.50) (1.77) (2.38) (1.56) (1.47) (1.48) (1.32)
20 4.23 6.34 12.57 4.91 5.71 11.81 9.67
(1.03) (1.31) (1.74) (1.13) (1.15) (1.14) (1.06)
30 3.74 6.13 10.70 4.37 5.48 11.19 9.80
(0.86) (1.12) (1.44) (0.93) (0.99) (0.99) (0.95)
40 3.34 5.90 8.68 3.90 5.04 10.10 9.48
(0.74) (1.00) (1.18) (0.78) (0.86) (0.87) (0.86)
50 3.04 5.78 7.20 3.63 4.61 9.12 9.00
(0.68) (0.95) (1.03) (0.71) (0.78) (0.80) (0.81)
60 2.76 5.68 6.03 3.44 4.20 8.23 8.47
(0.64) (0.93) (0.93) (0.67) (0.73) (0.76) (0.78)
70 2.45 5.55 5.01 3.29 3.76 7.37 7.85
(0.62) (0.93) (0.86) (0.65) (0.69) (0.74) (0.76)
80 2.03 5.23 4.02 3.12 3.15 6.32 6.93
(0.61) (0.97) (0.82) (0.67) (0.66) (0.74) (0.76)
90 1.60 4.38 3.30 2.90 2.30 5.07 5.50
(0.65) (1.06) (0.88) (0.75) (0.65) (0.80) (0.80)
95 1.68 3.27 2.89 2.56 1.52 4.03 4.02
(0.84) (1.16) (1.04) (0.87) (0.64) (0.91) (0.86)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their
median value.
In 2004, however, there has been a sharp increase in arrears, where the increase is
focused on middle-income and higher income households (the increase is statistically
significant, compared to 1995, for all households between the 50th and 90th centile of
the income distribution). The fact that the increase in arrears was among these income
groups explains the focus that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 placed on making it
more difficult for these households to escape their debts. Indeed, in 2007, there was a
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sharp and statistically significant fall in rates of arrears among middle and higher income
households compared to 2004: rates of arrears had returned to those observed in earlier
years, suggesting that the Act had succeeded in its objectives.
However, the rebound in rates of arrears in 2007 is not the end of the story. There was
a sharp increase in rates of arrears in 2010, associated with the subprime crisis. However,
this increase was not uniquely focused on low income households, as it encompassed all
income groups similarly: arrears among low, middle, and high income groups all increased
by around 6%. That is, arrears increased for prime and subprime households equally.
In 2013, there was a small but statistically insignificant recovery in rates of arrears at all
income groups. If 2013 is compared to 2007, then arrears are significantly worse in 2013 for
all households above the 30th centile of income (but not significant at lower income levels).
This is despite the fact that by 2013, the US economy was no longer in recession.
The differences between couples and non-couples are never significant. Similarly,
until the last two waves, there was no significant difference between college-educated
and non-college-educated households. This changed in 2010, when college-educated
households became significantly more likely to repay. The changes over time are not for
college educated households. However, non-college households significantly increased
arrears in 2004, and recovered in 2007, before there was a sharp increase in arrears among
these households in 2010 and 2013.
Appendix C.2. Application Behaviour
Recall that Dell’Arricia et al. (2012) have argued that there was a change in application
behaviour. Figure 3 and Table A6 show how application behaviour has been changing.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows that while in each year there is no difference across age
groups (all other variables are held at the median), that nevertheless, there was an increase
in the desire for credit over time. Significantly more households desired credit in 1998 than
in 1995 at all age levels (there was a 3 percent increase at younger ages, and a 4 percent
increase at older ages). Furthermore, in 2007, the demand for credit was significantly higher
than in 2004 at all ages. The demand for credit then fell significantly in 2010 for the oldest
households, and had fallen back to 2004 levels for all households by 2013.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 (and Table A6) shows that in each year, lower income
households are less likely to apply for credit than high income households, with these
differences across income groups being significant in every year in the survey. However,
the proportion of households wanting credit in each income group has been changing
over time. In 1998 and 2001, the proportion of households that wanted credit increased
compared to 1995 for all households. This increase was larger for lower income households:
in 1998, households at the 10th centile increased by over 7.8%, while households at the 90th
income centile increased by over 2.7% (the difference was significant for all households
from the 10th income centile). There was a small, but statistically insignificant decline
in the desire for credit in 2004, before the desire for credit recovered in 2007, where the
increase was concentrated in poorer households: households at the 20th centile increased
by 4.4%, while households at the 70th centile increased by 1.6% (the increase, compared
to 2004, was significant for households between the 20th and 70th centile). Note that the
Bankruptcy Act, by making default more onerous, predicts that fewer households should
apply for credit; but this is not what has been found here. In the last two waves of the
survey, there has been a decline in households reporting that they would like a loan, and
this decline, compared to 2007, became significant by 2013.
In 1995 and 1998, Table A6 shows that couples were more likely to want credit than
non-couple households, but these differences were no longer significant in 2001. The
only subsequent wave in which couples report they are significantly more likely to want
credit is in 2010, a year in which there was a sharp decrease of 4.1 percent in the desire
for credit among single households but no significant decrease by couples; instead, it
took until 2013 for there to be a significant fall in the desire for credit among couples,
when it fell by 1.7 percent. In 1995, university graduates were significantly more likely
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to want a loan than non-university households, but this difference disappeared in 1998
(both types had a significant increase in their demand for credit, but the increase for non-
university households was larger). There remained no statistically significant differences
in the demand for credit until 2013, when a sharp and statistically significant fall in the
demand for credit among non-university households meant that statistically significant
differences between university and non-university households re-emerged.
It is also interesting to look at the differences across the income distribution at age 30 and
age 60 (shown in Table A9). At age 30 in 1995, 88.6% of households at the bottom of the income
distribution reported that they wanted a loan, while 95.3% of households at the top of the
income distribution want a loan (and these differences are statistically significant). Similarly,
the difference between the low and high income 60-year-olds (from 83.2% of households to
94.9% of households) is also significant. However, more interesting are the changes over time.
The proportion of 30-year-old households who want a loan significantly increases in 1998
at all income levels, and this high level is maintained in 2001. In 2004 (the period covered
by the sub-prime crisis), there was a large and significant fall among the lowest income
30-year-old households (from 94.9% to 86.0%), but the rather smaller fall among middle
income households (from 95.5% to 94.6%) and higher income households have not changed
significantly. There was a recovery in the demand for credit in 2007 at all income levels, which
is significant for the lowest income households: the level of demand looks similar to results
for 1998 and 2001. While low income 30-year-old households also reduced demand in 2010
and 2013, the falls in these two waves are not statistically significant.
The results for 60-year-old households are similar: there is a large and statistically
significant increase in the demand for credit between 1995 and 1998 among the lowest
income households from 83.2% to 94.4%, and a smaller and insignificant increase for
high income households. However, in contrast to the results for younger households, the
decline in credit demand in 2004 was similar across all income groups and not statistically
significant. Among 60-year-old households, high income households increased demand
from 94.3% to 98.0% in 2007, while low income households increased demand from 90.9%
to 94.7%, but the result is only statistically significant for the high income group. There was
then a significant fall in the demand for credit among these higher income groups in 2010.
Table A6. Estimates of Applicants for Credit for 1995–2013.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Age
25 92.82 95.84 95.58 94.32 97.50 95.70 93.88
(0.96) (0.79) (0.78) (0.94) (0.63) (0.64) (0.85)
29 92.93 96.01 95.51 94.46 97.14 95.96 93.97
(0.82) (0.65) (0.68) (0.78) (0.57) (0.52) (0.71)
33 92.73 96.19 95.45 94.62 96.86 96.17 94.09
(0.75) (0.57) (0.62) (0.69) (0.54) (0.46) (0.63)
37 92.25 96.41 95.38 94.74 96.74 96.28 94.24
(0.75) (0.53) (0.60) (0.64) (0.52) (0.43) (0.58)
41 91.67 96.70 95.27 94.80 96.78 96.28 94.40
(0.77) (0.51) (0.60) (0.63) (0.50) (0.42) (0.56)
45 91.19 97.02 95.13 94.79 96.97 96.22 94.52
(0.81) (0.50) (0.62) (0.64) (0.49) (0.42) (0.54)
49 90.96 97.25 95.01 94.73 97.21 96.11 94.57
(0.87) (0.51) (0.66) (0.66) (0.49) (0.44) (0.54)
53 90.96 97.24 94.99 94.67 97.44 95.95 94.62
(0.94) (0.55) (0.71) (0.71) (0.49) (0.46) (0.55)
57 91.11 96.94 95.12 94.62 97.60 95.70 94.75
(1.03) (0.64) (0.78) (0.78) (0.52) (0.51) (0.58)
61 91.35 96.46 95.37 94.56 97.65 95.35 94.96
(1.15) (0.78) (0.87) (0.90) (0.59) (0.60) (0.64)
65 91.64 95.93 95.69 94.46 97.57 94.90 95.21
(1.35) (1.00) (1.00) (1.09) (0.72) (0.75) (0.75)
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Table A6. Cont.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Income Centile
5 87.00 92.69 93.35 90.10 94.88 90.74 92.01
(2.65) (1.97) (1.77) (2.10) (1.56) (1.39) (1.43)
10 87.11 94.96 92.75 89.77 94.94 91.34 91.22
(1.84) (1.19) (1.39) (1.59) (1.11) (1.01) (1.08)
20 87.80 95.91 92.81 90.85 95.25 93.06 91.61
(1.30) (0.81) (1.06) (1.14) (0.82) (0.71) (0.83)
30 88.74 96.24 93.37 92.17 95.72 94.28 92.41
(1.08) (0.67) (0.89) (0.92) (0.68) (0.58) (0.71)
40 90.07 96.64 94.29 93.72 96.40 95.48 93.56
(0.90) (0.56) (0.73) (0.74) (0.56) (0.48) (0.61)
50 91.20 97.01 95.10 94.80 96.97 96.22 94.53
(0.81) (0.50) (0.63) (0.64) (0.49) (0.42) (0.54)
60 92.20 97.35 95.79 95.58 97.43 96.69 95.36
(0.76) (0.46) (0.57) (0.57) (0.44) (0.39) (0.50)
70 93.17 97.69 96.42 96.20 97.83 97.00 96.14
(0.72) (0.43) (0.52) (0.54) (0.41) (0.38) (0.46)
80 94.32 98.06 97.08 96.72 98.19 97.16 96.99
(0.72) (0.42) (0.50) (0.53) (0.39) (0.40) (0.44)
90 95.50 98.28 97.54 96.94 98.34 97.07 97.81
(0.79) (0.47) (0.54) (0.60) (0.44) (0.50) (0.45)
95 96.07 98.04 97.36 96.67 98.07 96.81 98.29
(0.98) (0.66) (0.72) (0.80) (0.61) (0.67) (0.50)
Couple
0 85.66 92.49 93.92 94.13 97.86 93.73 94.60
(1.40) (0.99) (0.85) (0.83) (0.54) (0.69) (0.71)
1 91.19 96.99 95.12 94.80 96.97 96.22 94.52
(0.81) (0.49) (0.63) (0.64) (0.49) (0.42) (0.54)
University
0 91.16 97.01 95.12 94.80 96.97 96.22 94.51
(0.81) (0.50) (0.63) (0.64) (0.49) (0.42) (0.54)
1 94.91 96.27 96.66 95.71 97.34 96.92 97.17
(1.10) (0.93) (0.85) (0.98) (0.76) (0.64) (0.62)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their
median value.
Appendix C.3. Acceptance Behaviour
Figure 4 and Table A7 describe the rate at which credit applications are accepted by
the lender and given the loan. In the early years of the sample, younger households are
significantly more likely to get the credit they want than older households, as there is a sharp
drop-off in credit acceptance of households in the fifties and sixties (the oldest households are
11.8 percent less likely to get credit than the youngest households in 1995). In 1998 and 2001,
there was a steady increase in the availability of credit to all age groups, but this increase was
larger for these older households (credit to 65-year-old households who want credit increased
by 6.1 percent, while credit to 29-year-old households only increased by 3.2 percent). In the
2004 recession, credit to older households continued to increase, while there was a sharp
decline in credit to the youngest households in the sample, consequently, households in their
sixties and now more likely to get the credit they want than households in their twenties.
There was a recovery in acceptance rates to these younger households in 2007. In 2010 and
2013, households of all ages saw a decline in credit acceptance, but the falls are largest (and
only statistically significant) for youngest households. In 2010 and 2013 credit acceptance
is highest for middle-aged households and lowest for the youngest households with the
difference between these two age groups being significant.
In 1995, couples are 4.8 percent more likely to get the credit they want than non-
couples; in 1998, they were 4.7 percent more likely to get credit. Credit to both groups fell
in 2004; but couples were still significantly more likely to get credit by 3.9 percent. The
differences between couples and single households is not significant in 2007, but returned
to being significant, with the effect widening in 2010 and 2013; the difference being nearly
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8.0 percent in 2013. University households are no more likely to receive the credit they
want than non-university households in any wave before 2004. However, in 2004, there was
a significant fall of 2.8 percent in credit being given to non-university households, which
means that they are now significantly less likely to get credit than university households
(the difference is 3.3 percent). This difference remains significant in 2010 and 2013 (the
differences are not significant in 2007).
Table A7. Estimates of Whether Credit Applicant is Given Loan for 1995–2013.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Age
25 91.18 91.41 95.21 87.41 93.55 85.28 87.34
(1.10) (1.13) (0.84) (1.39) (1.00) (1.15) (1.21)
29 92.00 91.80 95.26 88.62 93.24 86.19 87.99
(0.90) (0.93) (0.71) (1.13) (0.87) (0.94) (0.99)
33 92.68 92.32 95.39 89.76 92.85 87.22 88.78
(0.79) (0.81) (0.64) (0.96) (0.80) (0.81) (0.86)
37 93.06 92.84 95.52 90.73 92.39 88.29 89.73
(0.74) (0.74) (0.60) (0.87) (0.78) (0.74) (0.78)
41 92.94 93.10 95.45 91.50 91.88 89.22 90.70
(0.75) (0.73) (0.61) (0.82) (0.79) (0.70) (0.72)
45 92.12 92.82 94.91 92.08 91.36 89.81 91.41
(0.81) (0.77) (0.66) (0.80) (0.82) (0.68) (0.68)
49 90.49 91.80 93.69 92.46 90.88 89.96 91.59
(0.94) (0.87) (0.76) (0.81) (0.86) (0.69) (0.68)
53 88.04 90.07 91.78 92.62 90.49 89.72 91.18
(1.12) (1.02) (0.93) (0.86) (0.92) (0.73) (0.71)
57 85.06 87.90 89.49 92.61 90.21 89.25 90.37
(1.36) (1.23) (1.14) (0.94) (1.02) (0.80) (0.79)
61 82.03 85.59 87.27 92.51 89.97 88.68 89.38
(1.65) (1.51) (1.42) (1.08) (1.17) (0.92) (0.92)
65 79.35 83.34 85.48 92.42 89.66 88.10 88.43
(2.07) (1.92) (1.79) (1.31) (1.43) (1.13) (1.14)
Income Centile
5 64.52 73.51 73.77 58.16 68.94 66.45 59.66
(4.05) (3.45) (3.19) (3.73) (3.36) (2.43) (2.69)
10 74.42 79.77 79.87 68.84 75.97 72.75 68.28
(2.57) (2.23) (2.20) (2.62) (2.23) (1.70) (1.86)
20 82.55 85.12 87.31 79.29 82.01 79.23 78.16
(1.61) (1.48) (1.40) (1.71) (1.52) (1.21) (1.29)
30 86.55 88.11 90.95 84.70 85.50 83.19 83.74
(1.23) (1.16) (1.04) (1.30) (1.22) (0.99) (1.03)
40 90.01 90.96 93.61 89.35 89.00 87.20 88.62
(0.95) (0.91) (0.78) (0.98) (0.97) (0.80) (0.81)
50 92.11 92.81 94.93 92.08 91.34 89.91 91.43
(0.81) (0.77) (0.65) (0.80) (0.82) (0.70) (0.69)
60 93.57 94.17 95.72 93.94 93.07 91.93 93.25
(0.72) (0.68) (0.58) (0.69) (0.72) (0.62) (0.61)
70 94.75 95.30 96.32 95.40 94.46 93.59 94.59
(0.66) (0.61) (0.54) (0.60) (0.65) (0.57) (0.56)
80 95.85 96.41 96.93 96.73 95.76 95.12 95.75
(0.64) (0.57) (0.51) (0.54) (0.60) (0.54) (0.53)
90 96.69 97.30 97.60 97.69 96.67 96.01 96.64
(0.70) (0.60) (0.54) (0.54) (0.64) (0.59) (0.56)
95 96.98 97.65 98.07 97.90 96.90 95.80 97.06
(0.88) (0.73) (0.62) (0.66) (0.78) (0.79) (0.66)
Couple
0 87.43 89.85 89.20 88.15 88.22 83.24 83.46
(1.45) (1.20) (1.13) (1.18) (1.22) (1.10) (1.19)
1 92.21 92.83 94.91 92.05 91.35 89.85 91.41
(0.82) (0.77) (0.65) (0.80) (0.82) (0.69) (0.68)
University
0 92.06 92.82 94.91 92.06 91.35 89.85 91.42
(0.80) (0.77) (0.65) (0.80) (0.82) (0.69) (0.68)
1 90.79 93.26 92.96 95.37 93.00 94.16 94.83
(1.48) (1.25) (1.24) (1.03) (1.23) (0.88) (0.83)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their
median value. Non-applicants are excluded.
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Table A8. Estimates of Arrears Among Borrowers for 1995–2013.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Age
25 10.36 9.47 12.53 18.17 11.07 12.87 13.95
(1.19) (1.20) (1.30) (1.68) (1.31) (1.15) (1.30)
29 10.21 8.94 12.29 17.85 10.40 13.68 13.79
(1.00) (0.98) (1.10) (1.40) (1.08) (0.99) (1.08)
33 9.87 8.34 11.46 16.98 9.74 14.43 13.62
(0.90) (0.85) (0.97) (1.22) (0.95) (0.90) (0.96)
37 9.30 7.74 10.16 15.47 9.11 14.91 13.45
(0.84) (0.79) (0.88) (1.10) (0.87) (0.86) (0.90)
41 8.45 7.25 8.77 13.40 8.48 14.93 13.21
(0.80) (0.76) (0.82) (1.02) (0.83) (0.84) (0.86)
45 7.38 7.01 7.75 11.05 7.80 14.42 12.77
(0.78) (0.78) (0.80) (0.94) (0.81) (0.82) (0.83)
49 6.17 7.05 7.42 8.71 7.03 13.49 12.08
(0.77) (0.83) (0.83) (0.88) (0.79) (0.82) (0.81)
53 4.99 7.17 7.69 6.62 6.23 12.35 11.25
(0.76) (0.91) (0.91) (0.82) (0.79) (0.82) (0.81)
57 4.04 7.03 8.09 4.86 5.51 11.12 10.45
(0.77) (1.01) (1.04) (0.78) (0.82) (0.84) (0.84)
61 3.48 6.51 8.11 3.46 4.98 9.87 9.81
(0.82) (1.12) (1.21) (0.76) (0.89) (0.90) (0.91)
65 3.34 5.72 7.58 2.40 4.68 8.64 9.34
(0.98) (1.28) (1.42) (0.76) (1.04) (1.02) (1.07)
Income Centile
5 15.47 14.22 16.95 17.03 12.51 21.58 19.63
(3.43) (3.01) (3.00) (3.39) (2.70) (2.37) (2.62)
10 13.12 12.80 14.70 14.27 12.48 20.06 17.46
(2.11) (2.00) (2.06) (2.19) (1.87) (1.65) (1.71)
20 10.84 10.35 12.17 12.24 11.51 18.23 15.69
(1.35) (1.33) (1.41) (1.45) (1.33) (1.21) (1.20)
30 9.57 8.92 10.63 11.76 10.37 16.97 14.68
(1.07) (1.06) (1.13) (1.20) (1.09) (1.03) (1.02)
40 8.30 7.72 8.98 11.42 8.90 15.54 13.61
(0.87) (0.87) (0.92) (1.03) (0.90) (0.89) (0.89)
50 7.38 7.04 7.75 11.06 7.78 14.42 12.78
(0.78) (0.77) (0.80) (0.94) (0.80) (0.82) (0.83)
60 6.61 6.55 6.75 10.57 6.86 13.42 12.04
(0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.89) (0.73) (0.79) (0.79)
70 5.85 6.12 5.85 9.91 6.00 12.41 11.25
(0.69) (0.70) (0.67) (0.87) (0.68) (0.77) (0.78)
80 4.93 5.57 4.92 8.81 5.00 11.14 10.09
(0.69) (0.71) (0.64) (0.86) (0.65) (0.79) (0.79)
90 3.90 4.76 4.19 7.09 3.82 9.62 8.30
(0.75) (0.78) (0.70) (0.92) (0.67) (0.89) (0.85)
95 3.15 3.88 3.91 5.43 2.82 8.43 6.44
(0.90) (0.93) (0.86) (1.04) (0.73) (1.08) (0.97)
Couple
0 8.34 9.97 8.11 12.71 10.49 13.53 11.98
(1.16) (1.19) (1.03) (1.24) (1.22) (1.08) (1.10)
1 7.38 7.01 7.79 11.05 7.80 14.50 12.79
(0.78) (0.78) (0.81) (0.94) (0.81) (0.85) (0.83)
University
0 7.37 7.01 7.76 11.03 7.81 14.40 12.79
(0.78) (0.77) (0.80) (0.94) (0.81) (0.82) (0.83)
1 4.86 6.18 6.07 7.76 5.73 7.16 7.40
(1.14) (1.21) (1.18) (1.29) (1.17) (0.97) (1.00)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their
median value. Non-borrowers are excluded.
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Table A9. Applications for Credit at Different Income Centiles for Young and Old.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Income Centile: Age 30
5 88.24 94.19 94.89 85.97 93.53 90.88 91.98
(2.28) (1.56) (1.59) (2.57) (1.79) (1.48) (1.53)
10 90.37 94.88 94.40 86.36 93.35 91.19 92.55
(1.56) (1.11) (1.24) (1.85) (1.31) (1.07) (1.07)
20 91.41 95.06 94.45 88.96 94.32 92.56 92.71
(1.13) (0.85) (0.94) (1.30) (0.94) (0.78) (0.84)
30 91.91 95.23 94.65 91.04 95.28 93.72 92.96
(0.97) (0.75) (0.81) (1.06) (0.77) (0.66) (0.76)
40 92.47 95.62 95.04 93.17 96.34 95.05 93.47
(0.85) (0.67) (0.71) (0.86) (0.63) (0.56) (0.70)
50 92.93 96.06 95.48 94.54 97.06 96.01 94.00
(0.80) (0.62) (0.66) (0.76) (0.56) (0.50) (0.67)
60 93.35 96.50 95.96 95.48 97.57 96.76 94.49
(0.77) (0.59) (0.62) (0.70) (0.52) (0.47) (0.66)
70 93.77 96.98 96.52 96.19 97.98 97.39 94.94
(0.78) (0.57) (0.60) (0.67) (0.49) (0.44) (0.67)
80 94.30 97.57 97.27 96.78 98.36 98.00 95.38
(0.82) (0.57) (0.58) (0.69) (0.49) (0.44) (0.72)
90 94.92 98.23 98.10 97.08 98.67 98.45 95.62
(1.00) (0.62) (0.61) (0.83) (0.55) (0.50) (0.90)
95 95.36 98.58 98.45 97.09 98.81 98.60 95.63
(1.34) (0.76) (0.75) (1.12) (0.70) (0.66) (1.22)
Income Centile: Age 60
5 83.11 94.35 92.49 90.93 94.67 92.66 93.06
(3.55) (2.39) (2.24) (2.59) (1.99) (1.57) (1.62)
10 84.97 95.36 94.11 91.62 95.12 92.40 92.12
(2.42) (1.53) (1.56) (1.91) (1.39) (1.17) (1.24)
20 86.77 96.15 94.72 92.80 95.79 93.31 92.55
(1.75) (1.04) (1.18) (1.38) (1.00) (0.86) (0.93)
30 88.18 96.42 94.90 93.52 96.36 94.12 93.30
(1.47) (0.87) (1.02) (1.14) (0.82) (0.73) (0.79)
40 89.94 96.56 95.10 94.19 97.08 94.95 94.22
(1.25) (0.77) (0.90) (0.96) (0.66) (0.62) (0.68)
50 91.29 96.60 95.29 94.59 97.65 95.45 94.89
(1.13) (0.73) (0.84) (0.88) (0.56) (0.57) (0.61)
60 92.35 96.61 95.49 94.85 98.12 95.74 95.41
(1.05) (0.73) (0.81) (0.83) (0.49) (0.55) (0.58)
70 93.24 96.61 95.72 95.03 98.52 95.88 95.88
(1.01) (0.74) (0.79) (0.82) (0.44) (0.55) (0.56)
80 94.05 96.63 96.00 95.12 98.87 95.78 96.38
(1.03) (0.79) (0.81) (0.85) (0.40) (0.60) (0.55)
90 94.57 96.64 96.21 94.95 98.85 95.21 96.91
(1.19) (0.94) (0.94) (1.00) (0.46) (0.76) (0.60)
95 94.85 96.30 96.14 94.33 98.00 94.48 97.26
(1.46) (1.25) (1.20) (1.31) (0.73) (1.02) (0.70)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their
median value.
What about differences across income groups for younger and older households?
These are shown in Table A10. At age 30, there are large and statistically significant
differences in acceptance rates between low and middle income households and between
middle income and high income households in every wave of the survey. There are similar
results for 60-year-old households, where higher income households are significantly more
likely to receive the credit they want than lower income households. Among 30-year-old
households, the acceptance rate did not change at any income level between 1995 and 1998,
but there was an increase in the acceptance rate for households between the 20th and 60th
centiles of the income distribution in 2001, which was reversed in the downturn of 2004. In
2007, young households between the 20th and 60th centiles of the distribution again saw
an increase in their acceptance rate for credit, which was again reversed in the recession
in 2010 (and 2013 was similar to 2010). The pattern of changes over time is different for
60-year-old households: there is no significant difference in credit acceptance between
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1995, 1998 and 2001, but credit acceptance significantly improved in 2004 for households
between the 40th and 80th centiles of the income distribution compared to earlier years,
with no further improvement in 2007. Moreover, there was no decline in credit acceptance
for these older households in the sub-prime years (e.g., 2010 or 2013). It seems that there
are clear differences across age-levels in the way lenders reacted in both recessions covered
by the data.
Table A10. Credit Acceptance at Different Income Centiles for Young and Old.
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Income Centile: Age 30
5 67.63 65.73 72.23 64.22 64.93 65.00 59.37
(3.48) (3.27) (3.32) (3.86) (3.55) (2.56) (2.89)
10 75.26 72.93 79.04 69.77 75.17 69.94 65.15
(2.37) (2.29) (2.25) (2.67) (2.33) (1.80) (2.02)
20 82.75 81.04 86.96 76.74 83.65 75.69 73.30
(1.58) (1.59) (1.42) (1.86) (1.53) (1.32) (1.50)
30 86.62 85.42 90.80 81.22 87.61 79.45 78.90
(1.25) (1.28) (1.07) (1.51) (1.22) (1.13) (1.27)
40 90.03 89.39 93.74 85.79 91.02 83.53 84.53
(0.99) (1.03) (0.82) (1.24) (0.98) (0.98) (1.07)
50 92.14 91.92 95.26 88.95 93.14 86.55 88.14
(0.86) (0.89) (0.69) (1.08) (0.85) (0.89) (0.95)
60 93.67 93.78 96.16 91.39 94.65 89.01 90.70
(0.78) (0.79) (0.62) (0.97) (0.76) (0.83) (0.88)
70 94.93 95.35 96.77 93.54 95.87 91.27 92.73
(0.72) (0.71) (0.59) (0.88) (0.70) (0.79) (0.82)
80 96.17 96.94 97.25 95.81 97.01 93.75 94.68
(0.69) (0.64) (0.59) (0.79) (0.66) (0.76) (0.80)
90 97.20 98.33 97.62 97.88 97.83 96.06 96.38
(0.76) (0.61) (0.69) (0.72) (0.71) (0.79) (0.84)
95 97.72 99.05 97.91 98.93 98.15 97.19 97.38
(0.97) (0.63) (0.87) (0.70) (0.87) (0.93) (0.98)
Income Centile: Age 60
5 59.71 68.04 69.86 58.85 69.48 67.56 63.64
(5.01) (4.96) (4.05) (4.67) (4.15) (2.92) (3.18)
10 66.01 75.06 75.96 73.33 75.96 73.82 70.75
(3.43) (3.23) (2.92) (3.20) (2.81) (2.01) (2.19)
20 72.37 79.43 81.51 84.28 81.87 80.04 79.04
(2.45) (2.23) (2.10) (2.02) (1.94) (1.42) (1.51)
30 76.33 81.73 84.18 88.27 85.12 83.54 83.57
(2.04) (1.85) (1.74) (1.54) (1.58) (1.17) (1.22)
40 80.23 84.22 86.41 91.06 88.14 86.83 87.44
(1.72) (1.57) (1.47) (1.21) (1.29) (0.98) (1.00)
50 82.73 86.15 87.78 92.53 90.01 88.89 89.61
(1.56) (1.43) (1.34) (1.04) (1.13) (0.87) (0.88)
60 84.51 87.76 88.82 93.50 91.31 90.32 90.97
(1.47) (1.34) (1.26) (0.95) (1.03) (0.82) (0.82)
70 85.96 89.22 89.79 94.20 92.32 91.39 91.91
(1.44) (1.29) (1.22) (0.90) (0.97) (0.79) (0.79)
80 87.37 90.67 90.98 94.71 93.21 92.17 92.64
(1.48) (1.29) (1.21) (0.90) (0.96) (0.81) (0.80)
90 88.51 91.57 92.39 94.49 93.67 92.21 93.08
(1.71) (1.47) (1.33) (1.07) (1.05) (0.97) (0.91)
95 88.59 91.72 92.82 93.02 93.19 91.60 93.15
(2.14) (1.85) (1.64) (1.49) (1.33) (1.27) (1.11)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Results are for kernel regressions in which all other variables are held at their
median value. Non-applicants are excluded.
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